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ABSTRACT 
 
STATE CAPACITY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE:  
THE CASE OF ISIS AND LIBYA  
 
 
TUBA GÖNEL 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution M.A. Thesis, September 2018 
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ateş Ali Altınordu 
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This study examines how factors such as a fragile / failed state and religiously 
motivated terrorism are related. In the introduction of the study, the focus is on the 
definition of the concept of weak state and the sufficient conditions to term a state as a 
weak state. Then, the relationship between the weak state factors on the one hand and 
radicalization and terrorism on the other are going to be clarified. In the second part of 
the thesis, weak state radicalism and terrorism are evaluated in terms of the political 
context of post-civilian administration, the incapacity to institute strong institutions and 
central authority, the inability to provide a minimum level of security, and insufficient 
public services in the Libyan case. Following a brief history of Libya and Gaddafi rule 
with respect to predominant factors undermining the power of the state, the post-Arab 
Spring Libya is going to be scrutinized in terms of weak state factors that allowed the 
rise of ISIS and other Islamist movements such as the fragile economic conditions, the 
deinstitutionalized justice system, security vulnerabilities, border security failure, and 
the trajectory of Islamic radicalism. This study seeks to provide an answer to the 
following questions: a) What are the weak state factors that are present in the case of 
Libya? b) What is the extent of relationship between weak state capacity and terrorism 
with respect to the case of Libya? 		
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ÖZET 
 
DEVLET YETERLİĞİ VE SİYASAL ŞİDDET:  
IŞİD VE LİBYA ÖRNEKLEMİ 
 
TUBA GÖNEL 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Eylül 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ateş Ali Altınordu 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Zayıf devlet, Libya, IŞİD, Terörizm 
 
Bu çalışma, hassas/kırılgan devlet ve dini gerekçelerle temellendirilen terörizmin 
arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymaktadır. İkincil olarak teorik bir çerçeve içerisinde 
incelenecek olan sorunsal ise radikal akımlar, hassas/kırılgan devlet ve terörizm 
ilişkisini sistematik olarak incelemeye çalışmaktır. Çalışmanın başlangıç bölümünün 
odak noktası zayıf/kırılgan devlet kavramının tanımlanması ve bir devleti zayıf/kırılgan 
devlet olarak tanımlamanın yeter koşulları ve unsurlardır. Ardından radikalleşme, 
terörizm ve kırılgan/zayıf devlet faktörleri arasındaki ilişkilerin bu konudaki literatür 
ışığında ortaya konulmasıdır. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, kırılgan/zayıf devlet 
içerisinde yaşam bulan radikalizm ve terörizm bağlantısı, sivil yönetim sonrası siyasal 
atmosfer, güçlü kurumlar ve merkezi otorite eksikliği, asgari düzeyde güvenlik seviyesi 
eksikliği ve kırılgan sosyal hizmetler ve sosyal zayıflıklar bağlamında Libya örneklemi 
değerlendirilmektedir. Libya ve Kaddafi yönetiminin, devlet gücünü baltalayan 
faktörler açısından incelenmesinin ardından, Arap Baharı sonrası Libya, kırılgan 
ekonomik durum, kurumsallaşmamış yargı sistemi, güvenlik zaafları, sınır koruma 
sorunları ve İslami köktenciliğin temelleri gibi dini gerekçelerle temellendirilen 
terörizme yol açan faktörler bakımından incelenmektedir. Bu çalışma şu iki araştırma 
konusunu cevap aramaktadır: a) Libya örnekleminde mevcudiyetini koruyan kırılgan 
devlet faktörleri nelerdir? b) Libya örneklemi göz önüne alındığında, kırılgan devlet 
yapısı ve terörizm arasındaki ilişkinin boyutu nedir? 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
	
	
  
The state is the most important subject of international law. Despite the emergence of 
many international organizations with the increasing effect of globalization, the state 
remains the most important element in terms of international law. Therefore, the 
weakening of the state and its collapse along with the emergence of new states deeply 
affect international law and international relations. In this respect, the factors driving to 
terrorism has been a focus therefore, requiring an immediate attention in the academic 
field as an international phenomenon. The fact that violence and terrorism reach peak 
levels in fragile-failed state conditions suggests the role of state failure as a crucial 
reason of terrorism. In fact, the findings of the Random Effects Panel Model, in which 
the Global Terrorism Index1 recorded the terrorism database of 156 countries from 2007 
to 2011, indicated that factors such as fragile-failed state and terrorism-related 
casualties cause the escalation of terrorist acts.  
 Another issue that is the central point of the study is terrorism with religious 
references. Particularly after the September 11 attacks, Islam is approached by many as 
a source that inspires terrorism and violent extremism. Terrorist organizations such as 
Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram have gained an international reputation for their 
terrorist acts within the last twenty years. Those are now at the forefront of academic 
studies in which Islam is represented as an inspiring source for terrorist acts. It is not the 
text, but the context, weak state factors that are argued out to be the main factor of 
terrorism and political violence.   
																																								 																				
1 Global Terrorism Index, 2017, “Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism” Institute for Economics 
and Peace Available at: 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%202017%20%284%29.pdf  
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 One of the most significant current discussions in the literature is on the main 
characteristics and causes of Islamic fundamentalism. 2The various approaches in the 
literature address Islamic fundamentalism with common findings. The general concepts 
and definitions have, in time, paved the way for standardization of the views on Islamic 
fundamentalism. However, changes in world politics have made it more complicated 
than before and affected the Muslims as well; such a one-level perspective can make it 
difficult to grasp the working dynamics. Post-conflict transitions provide a fruitful 
ground for fundamentalist and violent extremism due to ‘conducive’ socio-economic 
factors. The terrorist incidents find sponsorship from religious creed, socio-economic 
decline, and weak state capacity. 
 The primary objective of this research is to investigate the relationship 
between weak/fragile/failed states and the radical terrorism nourished by religious faith. 
One further main question in this study is the factors that contribute to the relationship. 
In other words, what are the other elements that strengthen the relationship between 
weak state capacity and terrorism, and why should they be regarded as primary 
contributors to this process? The study attempts to examine the factors facilitating the 
power basis of ISIS in the region after the end of the Civil War in Libya in 2011. It is 
divided into two parts: The first part deals with the definition of the concept of weak 
state and the factors facilitating it and elements associated with the concept. The 
purpose of the first part is to review the weak state indicators proposed by the Fund for 
Peace organization and S. Patrick and Rothberg.3 
 The second part begins by laying out the theoretical framework of the study 
based on the relationship between weak state and terrorism. Although radical religious 
movements use religious references as a motivation element, it seems that it is the 
socio-economic reasons that are the main dynamics behind terrorism in the cases of 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, Iraq and finally Libya. In fact, Jurgensmeyer et al4 argues 
																																								 																				
2 See: Ateş, D. "İslam Köktenciliği(!) Kökeni, Genel Nitelikleri, Tanımlar ve Sınıflamalar."    Akademik Orta Doğu, 
3, (2009).63-96. Also see Demir, H. (2016). Radikal Selefi Hareketler ve Terör Örgütleri: Kavram ve Teorik 
Çerçeve. Tepav. And also see: Muedini, F. “Sufism and Anti-Colonial Violent Resistance Movements: The 
Qadiriyya and Sanussi Orders in Algeria and Libya.” Open Theology (1), 134-145. (2015). 
 
3 Rotberg, R. I. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Washington: Brooking Institution Press. 
(2003). and, Patrick, S. “Weak States and Global Threats:.” Working Paper (2006 a). (76). and, Patrick, S. “Weak 
States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?”, The Washington Quarterly, 29 (2), (2006 b). 27-53. 
 
4 See: Juergensmeyer, M. Terror in the Mind of God. University of California. (2000). And also Juergensmeyer, M. 
“Terror Mandated by God.” Terrorism and Political Violence , 9 (2), (1997).16-23. 
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that Islamic terrorism is based on nominal references. Questions have been raised on 
socioeconomic reasons that are covered in the form of terrorism assisted with the sauce 
of the religious creed. In this context, it is argued in this study that a relationship 
between weak state factors and terrorism exists and need to be examined in the light of 
the theories of the weak state and the dynamics of terrorism. 
 The following section attempts to give an account of the relationship between 
weak state and terrorism in Libya within the framework the of post-Gaddafi transition 
process that can be identified with instability in post-civilian administration, inability to 
establish a strong central authority, security gaps, and public service deficits.  Weak 
state factors such as lack of security, lack of state control over militias, lack of 
legitimate constitution, lack of trained national security forces and lack of control over 
the energy sources have turned Libya into a safe haven for terrorist organizations. In 
that vein, ISIS, a self-claimed state in Iraqi and Syrian territory, has had burgeoning 
influence in this region. There is an increasing awareness of the effects of the weak state 
as a contributor to the expansion of the terrorist organization’s sphere of influence. In 
that aspect, the importance of fighting against the political challenges in weak states is 
seen as way of combating terrorism. This study seeks to address the following 
questions: a) What are the weak state factors that are applicable to the case of Libya? b) 
What is the extent of relationship between weak state capacity and terrorism in the case 
of Libya? c) What conditions of weak state activate and facilitate terrorism? Throughout 
the study, qualitative research method is employed in order to give an in-depth analysis 
and answers to the above-mentioned research questions. Quantitative data will be 
introduced to support the qualitative arguments whenever needed.    
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CHAPTER 2 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEAK STATE AND TERRORISM 
	
	
2.1. Discussions on the Concept of "Weak State" 
 
 
 This study attempts to examine the weak state conditions in which terrorism is 
activated and facilitated. In the light of the research questions above, the study is going 
to adopt contextual approach that prioritizes the specific institutional and political 
context which is weak state that causes terrorism. The core question of the study is the 
relationship between the rise of terrorism in Libya and deep problems of governance 
with inability to produce continuous and unified policies addressing to these problems. 
It is argued in the thesis that the more states have the capacity of fulfilling their duties; 
the less incidents of terrorism emerge. Setting out from the previous argument, it is also 
argued that the failure of sustaining a legitimate government legitimizes terrorist acts 
and normalizes extremists in society. This de facto legitimization contributes to the life 
span of these terrorist groups.  
 The driving motivation of the study is the scrutiny of Libya’s capacity to pass 
the most important test after the civil war. Therefore it is going to examine the security 
situation and the state capacity to establish control over terrorist groups, the possibility 
of ensuring the stable governing institutions, the level of training among Libyan 
officials, the management of the economic resources, and international support for a 
stable and inclusive government.  This section of the study attempts to shed light on the 
concepts and indicators of weak state.  
 There are as many definitions of the weak state as there are definitions of the 
state. In the anarchic structure of international system, weak states are limited by the 
acts of other actors, and the act of seeking self-interest is limited owing to the shortfall 
5	
	
in state capacity. In the contemporary scholarly literature, the power of central authority 
is assessed by the ability to seek the objectives securing the interest of the state and 
power to survive. Due to their restricted capacity, weak states exert little authority and 
fail in fulfilling their central duties. 
 The weak state concept is based on a contrast of states in the international 
environment. The weak state is in a hierarchical relationship with the other states as its 
survival is dependent on the consent, recognition, and protection of the other states. In 
that vein, setting the arguments above into a theoretical framework, scholars see weak 
forces (or small states) as present victims because of the goodness or indifference of the 
great powers. The international physical environment, ideological / cultural 
environment, economic environment, and legal environment are crucial for the survival 
chances of weak states. It means that possibility of the international consent and non-
intervention is higher if the location of the weak state does not provide access to natural 
resources and the means to preserve and prosper. In line with the argument, Hans 
Morgenthau, the father of Classical Realism claims, "Small nations owe their 
independence always to equilibrium forces, to the power of a protection force, and lack 
of attractiveness to imperialistic longing."5 In this precarious environment, the survival 
of weak states depends on the balance of the great powers. Weak states cannot act 
outside the expectations of these great powers when they apply force. In other words, 
the use of power is viable as long as the great powers are indifferent or in favour of it.  
International relations theorists thus study the weak states based on the structural 
characteristics of small states under the control network of major powers. 
 It has conclusively been shown by Migdal that the factors of weak state can be 
seen when the state is in “environment of conflict” in which the central authority is in 
struggle with the various social organizations. It is an environment characterized by 
lack of social control by the central authority. The relationship between “capable states” 
and “social control” has been widely investigated and it is suggested that high state 
capacity is possible only on the condition that “tremendous concentration of social 
control” is exercised. The longitudinal study by Migdal on concept of “capable state,” 
termed as state capacity throughout this study, reports that fragmented social 
organization leads to fragmented social control methods. Thus, it is more difficult to 
																																								 																				
5 Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Balance of Power.",International Relations Series Book 2, 1932. p.242. 
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form a “capable state” in a fragmented social structure.6 Migdal’s theory suggests that 
the relationship between state capacity and fragmented structure of the society can be 
applied to the case of Libya to give a comprehensive account of the question why it can 
be categorized as weak state since Libya, as will be shown in the following pages, is a 
state with highly fragmented social structure.  
In marking the lines of failed state, the concept of independent sovereign states 
is a focal point since sovereign states are certified to form or sign treaties and form 
alliances. In that respect, as members of the UN, independent sovereign states are 
subjects of international law. The Somalia case, for instance, played a crucial role in 
shaping analysts' views on what is failed state, as it was first described by Gerald B. 
Helman and Steven R. Ratner, since this state was completely abolished in 1990. The 
basic argument of Helman and Ratner in the article titled "Protecting Failed States" is 
that a new disturbing phenomenon has emerged with the end of the Cold War era: A 
state that is not eligible to be a member of the international community is categorized as 
a failed nation state.7  
The concept of weak state is employed to address a particular failure phase and 
there are also definitions for different failure phases such as fragile state, quasi-state, 
weak state, state failure, collapsed state, and failing state. It is important to examine the 
factors in understanding the "weak state" concept that emerges as a result of the 
historical and socio-economic factors that developed in the 20th century as well as the 
political problems that the states face in the 21st century. 
 Deficiency in central authority, control over the economic resources, 
sovereignty, legitimate use of violence, and fulfillment of normal state duties has been 
identified as the major criterion for state failure. One definition by Zartman is a "state 
that cannot fulfil its functions.”8 Potter provides a similar definition of this concept. 
Arguing that a failed state cannot be accounted for merely by its political and social 
environment, he defines it as a state that cannot fulfill its normal responsibilities. In the 
framework of this model, Potter has divided failing states into three categories: "weak", 
																																								 																				
6 Migdal, Joel S. Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World. 
Princeton University Press, 1988. pp.262-264. 
7 Helman, Gerald B., and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving failed states." Foreign Policy 89 1992. pp. 3-20. 
8 Zartman, I. William, ed. Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995. 
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"failing" and "failed."9 The above-mentioned view that lack of legitimate use of force is 
supported by Michael Ignatieff who claims that a failed state emerges when the central 
government loses its monopoly of violence.10 In his useful analysis of state failure, 
Rotberg suggests economic development is an integral part of state failure along with 
income distribution, security of representation and the immunity of private property.11 
All of these frameworks are helpful in identifying the parameters that qualify Libya as a 
failed / failing state. 
 Nowadays, economic-based definitions of the failed state model overshadow 
the definitions lacking analytical purposes proposed over the last 20 to 30 years. In 
recent findings, the limitations of state capacity, besides the weakness of the state, have 
been expanded in different ways elaborating on the failed state debates. In addition, 
considerable attention has been paid to deeper political issues such as the capacity to 
protect internal and external security, the ability of the state to penetrate society 
collectively, and state legitimacy. Weak states are now examined not only in terms of 
control over limited economic sources but also in terms of their inconsistent, fragile or 
dysfunctional political systems.  
 Although much of the research up to now has been rather descriptive in the 
concept of failed state, some studies face objections due to the ideological emphasis in 
framing the concept. In that vein, Charles Call critically approaches the idea of "failed 
state" and related concepts such as "failing", "fragile", "stressed" and "troubled" states 
for ethical, empirical, and practical reasons and attempts to express alternative terms for 
academics and policymakers as the indicators of the failing, fragile and troubled states 
are not applicable to the diversity of cases, or they can be explanatory for one but not 
the others. Hence he and argues that they are largely useless and ought to be abandoned. 
Set out to shed light on the factor of central authority deficit, William Easterly and 
Laura Freschi indicate that most existing definitions of "state failure" are inconsistent, 
and though most researchers acknowledge state failure to be related to the loss of state 
control and its ability to use force, its practical implications in real life remain 
																																								 																				
9 Potter, W. Donald, State Responsibility, Sovereignty, and Failed States, Proceedings of the Australasian Political 
Studies Association Conference, 29 September-1 October 2004, Adelaide, South Australia EJ (2004) [Refereed 
Conference Paper]  
10 Ignatieff, Michael. "State failure and nation-building." Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal, and political 
dilemmas306 (2003). Cited in Szuhai, Ilona. "Rethinking the concept of failed state." Central European Papers 3.2 
.2015. p.110. 
11 Rotberg, Robert. "Failed states, collapsed, weak states: causes and indicators." State Failure and State Failure and 
State Weakness in a Time of Terror (2003) pp. 337-63 cited in  Szuhai, Ilona. "Rethinking the concept of failed 
state." Central European Papers 3.2. 2015. p.100. 
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unexplained.12 Nowadays, as Freschi notes, the lack of consensus on the meaning of 
state failure in practice is a problematic situation.13 This is because various forms of 
failing state is the focus in studies, leading to confusion on the causes of failure.14 The 
effort to put many states under a single definition is another problem in the 
conceptualization of state failure.15  
 Despite all these criticisms, researchers on the failed state continuously 
propose additional criteria for this concept. The perspective attempting to define the 
failed state suggests that a "failed state" has three defining characteristics in terms of 
absence of mechanisms and institutions that effectively represent the state; failed state 
criteria are the lack of a legitimate government in negotiation processes that causes a 
lack in the consent from the people, the emergence and escalation of intense violence, 
and the need for humanitarian intervention developed by the United Nations.16   
 The common points of the many definitions of the failed state are; failed states 
cannot provide public services and security at a minimum level and may not be able to 
practice their governmental duties. Failure may also stem from the cultural context; they 
are the domination of a family, a clan or a tribe, as the basic unit of social organization, 
a religious group or a sectarian domination, the limits on the free flow of information, 
gender oppression by the state preventing the say of women in the rule, the failure to 
accept responsibility for individual or collective failure.17 
 Drawing on the above-mentioned arguments on the concept of failed state, the 
criteria to be the anchor of this study are the following: the failed state is the one that 
lacks most of what a state is supposed to have. Setting out from the argument, state is an 
organization with a rightful use of violence, with borders, with territory (territorial 
integrity), with power to enable recognition by the other actors as the legitimate entity 
and equal sovereignty. Sovereignty and independence are the key terms. The former 
means that it is the highest authority of its territory. The latter means that the actor is 
free to take any decision as far as the interest of the other actors, in other words, the 
greed and interest of the international superpowers is concerned. Hence in drawing the 
																																								 																				
12 Easterly, William, and Laura Freschi. "Top 5 reasons why «failed state» is a failed concept." Aid Watch 13. 2010. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ezrow, Natasha M., and Erica Frantz. Failed states and institutional decay: Understanding instability and poverty 
in the developing world. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2013. p.1324. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Orman, Turkan Firinci. "An Analysis of the Notion of a Failed State." Int'l J. Soc. Sci. Stud. 4. 2016. p.80. 
17 Ibid. 
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concept of failed state in an eclectic framework based upon the literature above, this 
study anchors on a) inability to monopolize power and rightful use of violence 
consented by the people, b) inability to protect the borders and territorial integrity 
(sovereignty), c) lack of recognition as a legitimate actor in the international 
environment.  
 The fall of nation-states is not a new phenomenon. In modern times, violent 
conflicts originated from weak state structures in countries in Africa, Asia, Oceania and 
Latin America, with political borders drawn in the post-colonial period, constitute 
unease both in the international system and national contexts. Facing humanitarian 
crisis such as poverty, disease, violence and refugee incidents that arise in the context of 
internal conflicts in weak states, international organizations and major powers are 
reluctant to face the chaos because of the humanitarian help they are to provide. 
 Especially since the September 11 attacks, weak states are seen as conducive 
to radical movements and terrorist organizations. Lack of unified governance in these 
countries has allowed both violence and illegal economic activity to develop. Political 
leaders’ indifferent attitudes and the rise of illegal developments facilitated by terrorism 
have begun to disturb international politics.18 In an era of terrorism, recognizing and 
reacting to the dynamics of nation-state failure has become a central concern of critical 
policy debate. The strengthening of weak states and the prevention of state failure have 
been among the urgent issues of the 21st century.19  
 These discussions on the weak state are useful in assessing whether Libya can 
be categorized as a weak state. For the purpose of analysis, the following pages are 
going to analyse the indicators of weak state and are supposed to increase the reliability 
of argument that the lack of state capacity is the case for Libya. These indicators are 
helpful in measuring the case country’s level of state capacity, which constitutes the 
independent variable of the study.   
2.2. Indicators of a Weak State 
  
 In one view, the increasing violence in Libya is a product of the weak state, 
which lacks sovereignty and monopoly on the use of power. The framework below is 
																																								 																				
18 Brooks, Rosa Ehrenreich. "Failed states, or the state as failure?." The University of Chicago Law Review. 2005. 
(Summer) pp. 1159-1196. 
19 Rotberg, "Failed states, collapsed, weak states:.” pp. 337-63. 
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going to be a useful theoretical background to assist in highlighting the relationship 
between the deep governance questions, – the incapacity of the state to address the 
problems – and local fiefdoms with the potential to destabilize the social cohesiveness, 
to undermine the territorial integrity, to sustain threat to the economic resources and 
political legitimacy and to be an instrument of international patronage. 
 Failed states coming into existence due to colonial rule or as the proxy states 
during Cold War among others are often victims of history as seen in the case of many 
African countries. As the space would not allow, it is impossible to discuss the history 
of weak states in political and social crises in the last fifty years. It would be an 
ambitious claim to argue that %70 percent of failed states are the reminiscent of the 
colonial period in the forms of mandates and trustees, since less than 30% of states’ 
current records date back to earlier than fifty years. The social, political and economic 
problems experienced by these malfunctioning states, are the traces of what is left from 
colonial and postcolonial rule. What is more, the major framework reconceptualising 
the former colonial states as failed states today emerged from various factors. The lack 
of control over the borders, the greed of the great powers to intervene so as to secure 
their national interests, the fundamental problems related to the operation of the state 
organism, perseverant regimes, and basic problems related to the economy are what is 
inherited from the colonization period.  
 The recent collapse of the states in Eastern Europe and Africa as exemplary 
forms of weak state structure has fuelled the debate on the ideal form of state 
organization. In order to underline the indicators of a failed state, it is first necessary to 
focus on the concept of the state and its basic characteristics. Several definitions of the 
state have been formulated so far. A preliminary work was undertaken by Georg 
Jellinek, who formulates it according to the theory known as "three elements theory" in 
Allgemeine Staatslehre in 1900. According to the theory, the state is defined as an entity 
formed by the combination of people, land, and sovereignty.20 The basis of the theory 
stems from Max Weber’s definition of the state “as a community that successfully 
claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory”. In other 
																																								 																				
20 Kelsen, Hans. Allgemeine staatslehre. Vol. 481. Berlin: Springer, 1925.  Cited in Gözler, Kemal. Devletin genel 
teorisi. Ekin Kitabevi, 2007. p.4. 
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words, Weber claims that the unique feature of the state is that it integrates the use of 
force with authority.21  
 Additionally, state strength is measured by its capacity to provide security, 
legitimacy of the authority, management of the economic resources and social welfare. 
In the context of security, governments ensure the safety of the community in two ways. 
The state is responsible for eliminating the external and internal threats that have 
potential to undermine the power of the state and harm the social cohesion. In that vein, 
Carlton-Ford and Boop describe security as the social well-being and the development 
of human capital through education. On the other hand, through the lenses of economic 
perspective, governments need to manage the economic resources and implement basic 
macroeconomic and financial policies, and make legal arrangements to ensure that 
entrepreneurs are provided with fertile ground for economic growth and productivity. 
Conclusively, regarding the social aspect, governments are responsible for making the 
necessary investments to subsidize and meet the basic needs of their citizens in terms of 
health, education, social and public services.22 
With the end of the cold war, the 1990s witnessed the demand for a better life 
standard which was the dominant factor promoting the importance of “individual 
security”. Such developments not only accelerated the trend of human rights but also 
enlarged its meaning as it is reformulated in various state policy forms. According to 
Rotberg nation-states are obliged to provide political goods to people living in certain 
borders by producing independent policies. The modern states are committed to 
responding to the fundamental concerns and demands of their citizens. The main 
argument to be made related to the social aspect is the following: through inclusive and 
deeper governance seeking to realize common values and goals, the external and local 
groups seeking to realize the local traditions and power structures can be eliminated. 
Thus, the existence of functional institutions in charge of dissipating the common 
concerns, involving in foreign affairs and providing dynamism within economic, 
political and social contexts is the roles expected to be fulfilled by the state.23  
																																								 																				
21 Weber, Max. "Basic sociological terms." Economy and society 1 (1978) pp. 3-62. Cited in Anter, Andreas. Max 
Weber's Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance. Springer, 2014. 
22 Carlton-Ford, Steve, and Donielle Boop. "Civil War and life chances: A multinational study." International 
Sociology 25.1 (2010): 75-97. Cited in Gökçe, Orhan. İçerik analizi: Kuramsal ve pratik bilgiler. Siyasal kitabevi, 
2006. pp.334-346. 
23 Rotberg, "Failed states, collapsed, weak states:.” pp. 337-63 
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Returning to the main point on how to define weak states, perhaps the most 
complicated question that political scientists have is the question how states are 
categorized; the reasons why states are weakened and the factors underlying their 
collapse. The lack of unanimity on the answers to such questions makes the debate even 
more complicated. In this process, various classifications based on different criteria 
have emerged. The classification of weak states merely proves itself an undeniable 
challenge, as there are a number of definitions in the literature. Helman and Ratner have 
conceptualized the term in three categories: "failing state", "failed state", and “new 
states” established after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union24. Rotberg 
categorized the states into five categories: strong, weak, failing, failed and collapse.25 In 
that vein, Herdegen, on the other hand, divided weak states into two: "failed and 
failing". Ratner categorizes the failed states based on their structural characteristics26, 
adversely, Rotberg proposes a different perspective on the question underlining the 
fundamental differences between strong and collapsed states with respect to their state 
capacity and the efficacy of facilities they provide.27 
 As it is a delicate subject, the differences across these various definitions tend to 
be troublesome. Koskinmaki explains the difficulty with the words: "the principal 
source of ambiguity is related to the criteria in which a state may be defined as in 
process of collapsing or a collapsed one.”28 This view is supported by Jones arguing, 
"state weakening is not just a question of capacity but also of will"29. Such an argument 
further raises the question of how states ought to power their administrative capacities 
and how to repair the worn-thorn central authority.  
  Failed states, in general, cope with two interrelated political problems: a) weak 
institutions, b) fragmented political identities. These problems undermining the 
legitimacy of the state form an obstacle against the construction of a sound management 
system, leading towards a more and more unstable political system. Stable political 
																																								 																				
24 Helman, "Saving failed states." pp. 3-20. 
25 Rotberg, Robert. "Failed states, collapsed, weak states:.” pp.337-63 
26 Herdegen, Matthias, ‘Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: “The Failed State’’, Berichte der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, 34. 1995, p.60 
27 Rotberg, "Failed states, collapsed, weak states:.”  pp. 337-63 
28 Akpinarli, N. (2010). The Fragility of the 'Failed State' Paradigm: A Different International LawPerception of the 
Absence of Effective Government (Developments in International Law). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. pp.96-97. 
29 Patrick, Stewart. "Weak states and global threats: Fact or fiction?." Washington Quarterly 29.2. 2006. p.30. 
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order and predictable economic, political and social progress are the fundamental 
components of the legitimacy of the contemporary state.  
  International organizations tend to have a rather superficial approach to the 
question of the weak state indicators. The Peace Fund organization, for instance, states 
that each event turning into a revolution or humanitarian crisis originates from "social, 
economic and political pressures not governed by professional, legitimate and 
representative state institutions". In its quantitative analysis, twelve indicators including 
social, economic and political and military pressures on state failure were incorporated. 
To begin with, the social indicators entail four subgroups including demographic 
pressures resulting from natural disasters (environmental problems and pollution), 
group problems powered by discrimination (sectarian-religious-ethnic violence), human 
and brain migration due to lack of opportunity and vacuum of human capital, and 
finally refugees and internally displaced individuals. Secondly, the economic indicators 
are comprised of sub-indicators, which are unstable economic development, poverty, 
and economic decline. Eventually, there are six sub-categories under the title of political 
and military indicators as in what follows: legitimacy of the state mechanism, public 
services, human rights and rule of law, elite groups, security and foreign intervention. 
What’s more, The Fund for Peace, making use of the data from international and local 
media sources, identifies sixty states that are opt to domestic conflict due to 
abovementioned indicators. According to annual results, the rankings of states as 
"successful" and "failed" are shown on a world map.30  
  The major theoretical issue that has dominated the field is the focus on the 
incapacity and dysfunctionality of the state rather than the conceptualization of the state 
failure. Such classification includes the following imperative criteria: "The structure of 
the public administration system", "violent monopoly", and "political will". States that 
fail to fulfil these criteria are described as "Failed States". The forthcoming part of this 
study attempts to analyse these criteria so as to provide a sound theoretical background 
in investigating the case country in the following chapters.  
As the functional approach suggests, the state would be accomplishing the 
primary purpose of survival by fulfilling the society’s common interest and methods 
through functioning institutions. What is more, the interests of the public take the 
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central point of the approach.  Failed states, on the other hand, often have ill functioning 
institutions that are not capable in the fields such as security, territorial integrity, 
provision of public- service. In this context, state institutions become dysfunctional and 
the social contract breaks as the citizens’ commitment to the state is gradually lost.31 
 Regarding the prime elements of the state, failed states have been shown to 
sustain a limited capacity and performance regarding the structure and function. In such 
cases, as the political power is perceived as the personal property of the ruler with the 
right to exploit the taxes and the revenue, the government is considered as "purely 
personal affair of the ruler".32  Moreover, old-boy network is the significant factor in 
recruitment and decision-making matters. The civil servants are not entirely qualified. 
That is to say, there is a lack of monitoring in civil servant recruitment or strict rules of 
employment. It is important to underline here that the governing body often constitutes 
a parallel power, that is, a shadow government.33 In that vein, the governments in most 
of the African states are often allegedly accused of hiring high officers based upon 
personal connection rather than sustaining qualified public officers. Consequently, most 
civil servants work for low salaries and are fired without a reasonable explanation. 
Bribery, in this respect, is common practice among civil servants and perceived as an 
instrument to increase the life standards. By the same token, civil servants in 
administrative offices often have 'staccato' careers which mean making a fast turnover 
of staff, or a challenge for any group to gain experience in a particular field of work and 
position. The bureaucracy is undermined owing to frequent changes in the position of 
civil servants.34  
Rotberg has drawn the attention to the fact that the inefficiency of a state to offer 
public services to its citizen is another way to determine the level of states failure. In 
that vein, Rotberg asserts that security, education, health, economic welfare, and 
infrastructure services are among the core public services that nation-states have to 
provide for their citizens. Yet, by their performance and effectiveness in delivering the 
utmost significant public services, it is easier to differentiate between strong states and 
weak states, and weak ones and failed ones. Additionally, ordering the level of state 
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34 Ezrow, Failed states and institutional decay: p.1326. 
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failure, Rotberg presents a hierarchical framework for positive state characteristics that 
include: a) security, particularly human security; b) the ability to adjudicate conflicts 
within and among institutions; the rule of law, property rights and the implementation 
of the social contract. c) Political participation; and d) regulation of social service 
provision, infrastructure, and economy. In this analysis, the strong state show high-level 
of capacity with respect to each above mentioned factors, while the situation is vice 
versa for the weak states. Rotberg underlines that a strong state ought to show high level 
of harmony with all these factors, if this is not the case, a single factor does not 
represent a full-fledged picture.35 
The minor difference in the conceptualization of "failed state" has also led to 
some differences in categorizing the weak states. The following definitions belong to 
the unsuccessful countries created around such indicators. For instance, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) has identified forty-six failed states. 
In another instance, The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Evaluation 
criteria have defined twenty-six countries as "fragile states calling them "Low-Income 
Countries under stress". Furthermore, The Foreign Policy Magazine has depicted sixty 
countries as "weak or unsuccessful", under twelve indicators including economic, 
political, and military issues. The Center for Global Development (CGD), a 
Washington-based think tank focusing on developmental issues and policies, 
categorizes forty-nine "poorly performing" countries under the scope of the US 
government's Millennium Challenge Account. The Commission of the Poor States and 
the US National Security, on the other hand, have released a list including the names of 
approximately fifty weak states. The controversy about the scientific evidence for most 
of these studies is the problem of overlooking any constitutional matter undermining 
political and economic development and focusing on inability or misfortune.36 
In line with the section drawing the lines of the concept of weak state, the basic 
indicator of a failed state is the lack of monopoly over the legitimate use of force within 
the borders of the territory. Depending on that frame the basic indicator of a weak state 
is the lack of capacity to enforce security, the use of power to sustain territorial 
integrity, and the ability to seek the national-interest within the framework of 
international environment in which all states are interest maximizing organizations.  
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2.2.1. Inefficiencies in the Security System 
  
 Unprofessional cadres and politicization of the military affairs appear to be the 
utmost reason of poor performance and the failure to eliminate the threats to the state 
and the citizens. Firstly, the scope of competence is not limited by legal protocols. 
Secondly, officers without satisfactory formal training are incompetent to carry out the 
expected duties as social and/or ethnic linkage is the prime criteria in employment. It is 
the level of loyalty and devotion that matters in promotions rather than the professional 
qualifications. It is the arbitrary promotions and recruitment methods that undermine the 
military institutions in African states. When the institutional elements are not in 
hierarchical order, the result is generally a sense of confusion in the target.37 A clear 
example was the regime that was conducive to ill functioning under the command chain 
of Muammer Gaddafi in Libya. What is more, the position and title of each officer in 
charge did not have any value in defining the hierarchy among them.38 Lack of 
professionalism, old-boys network, and politicization of the security mechanisms lead 
to formation of groups within the organism in which the policies serve more to the 
interests of the members of those groups rather than the state. In other words, the groups 
prioritizing their group identity over the identity of being a member of the same 
organization lead to intra-groups interest conflicts in the control over the other 
mechanisms of security. These above-mentioned factors are going to highlight the 
ongoing security weakness with the risk of perpetual violence in our case country. 
2.2.2. Inadequacy in Judicial System 
  
 Judicial independence is the prime question in weak states owing to the 
regime and high-level political interference. The regime parties have full control over 
assigning the judges to a specific court where the judges do not have the authority to 
decide about their future careers. Contracts with such officers are delivered on 5 years 
basis and may be terminated at any time. That is to say, the duration of employment is 
directly related to their level of obedience-towards the party. On the other hand, the 
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budget of the court authorities that is subsidized by the executive body covers the 
expenditures such as accommodation and education. The general name of executive 
body intervening in the judiciary affairs is called “telephone law” that is used to explain 
the legal framework of intervention as a means of affecting the decision of a court. In 
that sense, the judiciary is not expected to practice the principle of impartiality in 
service of meeting the needs of the people such as distributing justice and protecting the 
rights. As a result, all the above-mentioned factors have provided a basis for the 
dependence of the judiciary in failed states since the equal accessibility to judicial 
institutions is not possible due to the weak justice system.39  
2.2.3. Control over Boundaries 
 
 Another indicator of a failed state is the lack of sovereignty, as failed states 
have control over some certain areas whose ethnic and local interests are in harmony 
with the central authority. Moreover, the burgeoning problems with respect to authority 
and management are generally owing to the incompetence of the state as the central 
authority lacks the capacity to control the land.40 
 The incapacity to prevent violence is a key indicator of failed states as the 
more the instruments of security fail, the more rate of violence increases. Criminal 
organizations are even more visible and have more control over the streets than the state 
forces. Gun and drug trafficking becomes a common daily practice. Seeking for 
protection, citizens naturally secure themselves by becoming a part of a strong group 
whose solidarity is expected to provide a shield for the individuals. As a result, such 
criminal activities pave the way for the anarchy and the sense of despair so far 
mentioned.41 
2.2.4. Low Income Level 
  
 Poverty, low life-expectancy, illiteracy, inaccessibility to basic services, infant 
mortality, crime and corruption among others are argued out to stem from failed state 
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conditions. In general, states with weak institutions around the world are the ones 
mostly suffering. For instance, Africa with weak institutions, conflict and AIDS has 
witnessed burgeoning instability for ages due to the above-mentioned problems. On the 
contrary, in Latin America, the Caribbean, South Asia, Central Asia, the former Soviet 
Union and certain parts of Arab countries, political mistakes and aggravating economic 
conditions seem to be related to the phenomena of failed states. While stronger 
institutional and political environments seem to be more effective in making use of the 
revenue to enhance growth, states with lower incomes per capita are more likely to cope 
with conflicts and negative regime change.42 
 Apart from the constantly increasing poverty rate, income in failed states is 
distributed unequally owing to the arbitrary economic opportunities given to a 
privileged minority affiliated with the executive body. While those affiliated to the 
executive body are given incentives to enrich themselves, the less fortunate majority is 
deprived of their basic needs for survival. To name few, clients of executive elites and 
external entrepreneurship are given incentive through financial resources from those 
arbitrage differences hindering the right of the civilians to make a living out of their 
businesses. It is clear that the main objective of these states is never the growth in the 
welfare of the individuals.43 
2.3. Weak States and Radical Movements as a Basis of Terrorism 	
One major theoretical issue that has dominated the field for many years concerns 
a strong correlation between weak state and non-state actors providing security. In that 
vein, Elke Krahman suggests that new threats target communities and individuals, not 
states. One clear example is terrorism, as it is a form of violence against non-
governmental organizations with the purpose of a broader psychological effect on 
civilians. Even though several theories addressing how governments could stop terrorist 
activities have emerged, one of the limitations with these theories was the idea that the 
crisis are didactic and have potential to trigger further crisis.44 Owing to the inability to 
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establish common norms and shape the human behavior, societies without institutionary 
rules fall short of managing socio-political and economic arena. Additionally, 
continuing conflict over the property rights is seen as a factor highlighting cultural 
differences.45 As Ervin Staub states, "social and cultural conditions in a determined 
area, are by far the results of violence, mainly terrorism". As society faces with the 
economic trap, violence in the form of terror increases based upon the fruitful ground of 
religious radicalism, social and political turmoil.46 In that line, Francis Fukuyama 
suggests that “since the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the 
single most important problem for the international order.” In that sense, one can 
understand that the greatest threat to the US and world security stems from countries 
with bad governments rather than military threats of rival great powers, as Washington 
has officially acknowledged. For the same reason, Condoleezza Rice has listed 
countries responsible for creating the “spillover effect” that failed to take the respective 
measures regarding “responsible sovereignty”. What is more, terrorism originated from 
religious radicalism has also secured its place on the world agenda.47 In that sense, it 
has caused the weak states to become the foci of the issue as they are perceived as a 
source for the spread of weapons and violence. 
 During the George W. Bush administration, international commentators and 
the US adminisitration often claimed that weak states are more likely to turn out to be a 
hub providing fruitful ground for international terrorist organizations. In July 2005, The 
New York Times described, “Failed states unable to provide jobs and food for their 
people, having lost chunks of territory to warlords, incapable to keep track of their 
borders, send an invitation to terrorists". Research conducted by University of Maryland 
researchers revealed that most of the individual terrorists came from the Islamic 
countries with low-income, permanent turmoil and authoritarian rule: Sudan, Algeria, 
and Afghanistan. Similarly, data collected every year by the State Department has 
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revealed that most foreign terrorist organizations announced by the US security 
institutions between 2003 and 2005 used weak as primary operational bases.48 
 The theory of direct relationship between weak state and terrorism is 
vigorously challenged by Patrick as he rejects any generalization in this respect. He 
argues that the existing accounts fail to resolve the correlation as it is more complicated 
and this correlation is weaker than assumed. One of the limitations about the theory 
underlined by Patrick is that not all weak and failed states are directly affected by 
terrorism. Patrick notes that the focus of the terrorist activity is related more to the 
regional and religious determinants rather than the incapacity of the state. He provides 
proof to his argument by a comparative reading of the terrorist activities in the Middle 
East and  North Africa where the Muslim population is much bigger in number than 
those in Central Africa.49  
 The notion that fragile states with the potential to destabilize the surrounding 
neighbors and the region turn out to be a hub for terrorist organizations increased the 
focus on these states as they are perceived as a source of threats to international 
security. In this aspect, it is significant to identify the role of the social, political and 
economic elements that are prominent within the concept of fragile state. Though this 
part of the study touched upon these elements, the following chapters are going to 
examine them in more detail. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the weak state-
terrorism relation, religious references of terrorism and studies questioning the 
implications of religious radicalism have gained momentum.   
 Political discrimination, social and economic inequality in weak states are 
closely related to the radicalization and expansion of movements as seen in the Al 
Qaeda example. In this respect, it is necessary to get a deeper insight into the concept of 
state legitimacy. For Weber stating, "a specific form of social power, domination must 
be legitimized to be politically effective," legitimacy is the monopoly in the use of 
violence consented by the people. In addition, administrative functions, in other words 
the ability to deliver core public services, and the compelling power monopoly are 
linked to the ability to collect revenue from the citizens. Anderson, et al explains the 
complex relationship of all these factors as in what follows: the state’s capacity to rule, 
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as well as its legitimate ability to make use of force, is quite related to its capacity to 
collect taxes from society.50  
 Notably, security turns out to be the main issue when a weak state fails to fulfill 
socio-economic and political functions. These negative effects lead to dissenting masses 
in the country since the basic condition for a stable social life is the social and economic 
opportunities provided to all citizens. Nonetheless, there is a clear relationship between 
group victimization and terrorism. Scholars like Samuel Huntington argue that the 
higher the level of ethno linguistic heterogeneity, the more convenient ground for 
terrorism is the case. However, there are some questions as to whether the existence of 
only sociocultural divisions is directly linked to that. Dan Cox claims that cultural or 
ethnic divisions are often traded upon by governments and are used as the instruments 
to of hatred to marginalize or oppress the other groups.51  
           Others like O'Neil point out that the most important element contributing to the 
growth of terrorism is “basic human insecurity”. In addition, Gunaratna, the poor 
governance of poor state governments, poor economic development, corruption and 
lack of human rights all sharpen the attractiveness of ethnicity and strengthen the 
potential for terrorism. Failed states, by their incompetence, create "political goods 
vacuum" in which terrorist groups can stem from, expanding their effectiveness and 
activating personal security, economic aid or other services to gain support from the 
local people.52 
Weak governance and the emerging instability of weak institutions deepen 
violent events in countries and enable terrorist organizations to increase their 
effectiveness. What is more, in the case of entrenched patronage systems in which weak 
institutions and security system exist, the elites who have a say in administration 
exclude other groups, exploit public resources and create holes in the country economy. 
In that sense, criminal networks and armed groups start emerging to have role in 
society. To give an example, sidelined groups are more likely to engage in armed 
violence, especially if they lose access to power in the recent past. Nevertheless, the 
desire to participate in the competition for a say in the administration causes other 
problems to arise. The distribution of positions, authority, and resources among voters 
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might function as another determining factor triggering domestic political instability 
leading to an increase in rates in murder and drug trafficking. Furthermore, the fact that 
weak states and weak justice institutions cannot control weapons or punish violence 
aggravates the risk of such violent acts. In weak, unsuccessful and fragile countries, 
such symptoms expand "political goods vacuum" and create an area of activity, a fertile 
ground for terrorist groups.53 In other words, weak states cannot fulfill all of their oft-
mentioned basic functions in the political, legal, economic and social fields and it 
results in a lack of territorial integrity, an environment of conflicts and lack of 
legitimacy due to linguistic, racial or religious frustration that result in a questionable or 
lost state legitimacy.54 
               Last but not least, according to the Weberian theory, if failed states do not 
claim the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence against internal and external 
threats, issues such as emergence and escalation of civilian-like conflicts and the 
potential for failures in border control and security will be inevitable. The authority 
vacuum within the borders, which is the state rule without success, provides illegal 
organizations with unrivalled advantages to operate freely from interference. The areas 
where the state control is lacking will be a safe haven for terrorist groups to get 
organized. The southern region of Afghanistan where there is no state control is a clear 
example of the place where opportunities such as fundraising, new member recruitment 
and training of terrorist groups is managed. Moreover, failed states promote terrorist 
groups in two ways. These states often prevent foreign intervention into their territory 
and deliver visas to the members of terrorist groups through bribing.55   
 Framing the whole section as a conclusive remark, it is not the religion, but 
the utilization, even the exploitation of the religion, it is not the ideology but the 
utilization of the ideology, it is not the sects, but the utilization of the teachings of the 
sects in seeking the maximization of the self-interest that makes what a radical group is. 
It is the context that matters, no matter what the religious groups are, hence it is not the 
text but the context that causes terrorism. The theoretical claim in the study can be 
applied to other weak states. It is the groups seeking legitimacy through the power and 
motivation derived from the religion, ideology, norms of the social circle, sects and 
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ethnicity. It is not the religion, ideology, the norms of the social circle, sects and 
ethnicity that marks the lines, but the legitimacy seeking groups in search of 
maximizing their interests who derive the legacy from the above-mentioned factors.  In 
line with the section drawing the lines of the concept of weak state, the basic indicator 
of a failed state is the lack of monopoly over the legitimate use of force within the 
borders of the territory. Depending on that fragment, the basic indicator of a weak state 
is the lack of capacity to security, the use of power to sustain territorial integrity, and 
the ability to seek the national-interest within the framework of international 
environment in which all states are interest maximizing organizations. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE CASE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENT EXTREMISM  
IN WEAK STATE LIBYA 
	
	
3.1. Historical Background 
3.1.1 Brief Overview of Libyan History and Gaddafi 
  
 This chapter posits a review of the Libyan history and Gaddafi rule. The aim 
of this section is to examine the underlying dynamics that allow the researcher to 
examine the relationship between weak state and terrorism. The objective of the 
research is to figure out the basic components of what make Libya a weak state. In this 
section I attempt to defend the view that the personalized rule of Gaddafi, the codes of 
the state, inconsistent foreign policy and policy on tribes are unfolded in the post-
Gaddafi rule and turned out to be the factors weakening the state. This chapter describes 
the historical background of Libya, the rule of Gaddafi, the Green Book, The Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Gaddafi period Libyan foreign policy, and his policy 
on tribes. The following historical background is thought to reveal basis ethnic and 
sectarian fractions in Libya to be one of the interfering variable of the study in 
examining the relationship between weak state and terrorism.  
 The word Lebu, used by the so-called Berbers living in the West of the Nile in 
Ancient Egypt, became Libya; one of the most remarkable states of the Ottoman Empire 
in Africa since the conquest of Turgut Reis in 1551 until the Battle of Tripoli in 1911. 
During the beginning of World War I, as Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were under the 
control of the French, Egyptians had to fight with the British while Libya was fighting 
against the Italian invasion. Although the resistance movement led to many losses for 
the Italians at the time, up until the capture and execution of Ömer Muhtar in 1931, Italy 
was able to take full control over the whole country. Moreover, tebaa organized by 
Ottoman officers Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha mounted a stiff resistance against the 
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occupation forces. Such process that lasted 30 years of constant struggle by the 
command of Senûsi sheiks, gave way to the birth of a new Libya according to the 1919 
withdrawal of the Ottomans from these lands in accordance with the Mondros Armistice 
Agreement.   
 The Italian colonization of Libya turned into a striking situation that gained 
momentum leading to the first Italian agricultural colonies established under the control 
of the Ottomans and local mujahedin forces. Tripoli and Benghazi, the two most 
populous cities of Libya, were ruled under unilateral law of Ottomans. However, with 
the regime of oppression engineered by the Mussolini regime, the situation changed and 
the Italian colonial governors were appointed to fulfill a central role. Such act 
comprised all the issues related to regulations and instructions of the colonial order that 
led to new policies of repression and ineffectiveness against the nomadic and Bedouin 
people, with a high risk of irreversible ethnic fractionalization to emerge in the future. 
For instance, people were taken under control by identity cards and registering their 
weapons; many were expelled from fertile lands and forced to settle in infertile lands in 
that left no escape route to build any parallel autonomy. That being said, education 
emerged as one of the focal points to increase the public visibility of Italian existence in 
Libya. Italian language and culture were taught in mixed schools while talented middle-
class Muslim children were removed from school with a certificate in an effort to hinder 
them from the same level of knowledge and experience as the Italians.56  
 Right after the defeat in World War II by 1942, Italia’s rule in Libya finished. 
In 1949, a constitutional amendment was in progress as suggested by the British for a 
full withdrawal of the civilian Italian colonies that lasted until 1950. In the same year, 
the United Nations decided to recognize Libya as an independent state and on October 
7, 1951, the Constitution by the United Kingdom over Libya was accepted. 
Furthermore, The United Nations proclaimed the independence of Libya on November 
27, 1951.57  
 Up until the discovery of large oil deposits in 1959 in the foothills of the 
Zelten Mountains in Libya, the country had been struggling with financial crisis for 
some years. Along with oil, many plans emerged improve the infrastructure and 
economy of the country. However, such development opened a paradox related to the 
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slow development generating considerable displeasure and resentment over time. That 
being said, even though the oil resources provide good revenue for the king and royal 
family, the key problem is the deterioration of the Libyans’ life standard.  
 Very similar to the political problems, Libya’s economy still copes with 
legacy of Gaddafi rule as the economic policy was the ultimate control as long as it 
provides sustainability of the regime.  Despite the revenue extracted from these natural 
sources, the state’s main question has much to do with governance challenges rather 
than lack of funds. The gap between the ruler class and the ruled is going to be a focal 
point in comprehending the deterioration of the central power in the following pages.  
 On September 1969, a military coup led by Muammar Gaddafi toppled the 
Senûsi government down in the absence of the king. Nevertheless, the rapid rise in 
military ranks by Gaddafi led to seize of political power and a rather monopolized, 
personalized state and institutions.58 
3.1.2. Libya During the Rule of Gaddafi 
	
 The rule of Gaddafi needs to be touched upon as it is the period when 
corruption, lawlessness and questions about the politics and socio-economy of the Libya 
were shaped. It is also a central point as it gives the basic components of what led to 
bloody and protracted civil war in Libya. There are several prime issues to be addressed 
in the Gaddafi’s regime period. The first one, The Zahara declaration is the foundation 
document of a new regime.  The second key point is the Green Book in which Gaddafi 
defined his ideology and put forth its practicality and principles. Lastly, it is about the 
Libyan foreign policy with respect to the Arab League assisting terrorism and Western 
countries’ isolation and polarization policy on Libya.59 
 After the 1969 coup and later overthrow of King Idris’ rule, Gaddafi adopted a 
an ideology of Islamic-Socialist synthesis called The Third Universal Theory, which in 
this context suspended the existing legal system, giving place to a Shariat law based on 
Arab nationalism with a visible adore of Jamal Abd al-Nasir.  Later in time, on 15 April 
1973, Gaddafi clarified his ideology with what was known as the "Zawara Declaration" 
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and put his plan into practice eliminating the bureaucracy, intellectuals and regime 
opponents in order to remove the legal and political obstacles before a dictatorial 
regime.60 Consequently, committees were established in order to remove the mayors, 
bureaucrats, public officers, and public governors who were against socialism and Arab 
nationalism.61  
 The lack of institutional development in Libya might be an advantage or 
disadvantage. It might be an advantage as it almost starts from scratch. The existence of 
old institution might have meant resistance to the reform. As there is no institutional 
remnant from the old regime, the central authority is thought to build from the scratch. 
It might be a disadvantage as institutions mean the transmission of tradition and 
political culture and failure in transferring the tradition might result in failure in 
establishing a functioning state. The rule of Gaddafi left Libya at the prong in this 
aspect. The implications of the lack of institutional development are going to be 
analyzed as a factor of weak state. So as to provide an in-depth analysis of the political 
challenges, we ne need to understand the role of key institutions and documents.   
3.1.2.1. The Green Book 
   
 Prime document giving shape to the political culture and history of Libya is 
the Green Book as it has implications on the political culture, ideology, ideational world 
of the ruler and ruling party. In 1975, Gaddafi published the chapters of "Green Book" 
as propaganda book circulating his political ideology and thought. Even though 
publication dates vary according to different sources, the first chapter called “the 
Resolution on Democratic Problems: The Authority of the People” was published in 
1976. The second chapter on Economic Problem Solution in 1977 and the third on 
Social Foundations of Universal Theory was then released in 1979. In the first part of 
the Green Book titled "The Solution of Democratic Problems," Gaddafi stated critical 
view on the representative democracy to make his own ideology reasonable. According 
to Gaddafi, all of the political systems are products of the power struggle between 
alternative and existing institutions, and democracy serves the same objective, that is 
dictatorship. What is more, many of the issues discussed in the book, ranged under the 
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titles of State Administration, Parliament and Class and Peoples' Votes. Touching every 
single related issue, Gaddafi claimed that the tyrants are affected by the parliaments and 
political parties as these tyrants are the modern forms of dictatorships. He also makes a 
discursive attack on public voting and claims them to be unjust and despotic posing a 
deception about democracy.62  
 In the second chapter of the book, Gaddafi's ideas on the existing economic 
system were included under the titles of Needs, Housing, Income, Transportation, Land 
and Maids to justify his socialist economic model. Moreover, in the last part of the 
Green Book thoughts were addressed on the matters of Education, Music, and Art, 
Sports, Equestrian, and Stage dominated by Family, Tribe, Tribe Reality, Nation, 
Women, and Minorities. In that sense, social and national factors are the most important 
dynamics of human history as they hold the ties among the members of the society.63 
3.1.2.2. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
  
 Central to the entire ideational world and statehood of Libya, Jamahiriya is 
also a major concept in understanding the remnant of the old regime. Announced by 
Gaddafi as an alternative form of government to be applied to the entire Third World, 
the concept of Jamahiriya is against capitalism and benefits from communism as it 
makes reference to the key terms inspired from socialism. It constitutes Arab 
nationalism and a specific interpretation of Islam, and an independent thought system 
without any need for political parties. At first, Jamahiriya received great support from 
downtrodden and middle class circles of the Libyan society since Gaddafi portrayed 
himself as an egalitarian political figure inspired by economic, social and political 
approaches embracing the whole society. After The Decentralized People's Congress 
the central power was decentralized to the local governors. In that regard, the General 
People’s Committee (GPC), which replaced the ministerial board with the “Declaration 
on Substitution of People’s Administration”, issued in 1977 by assigning a general 
secretary and 20 ministers with executive power. Although Gaddafi handed down a 
large scope of duties to the WTO with various bureaucratic and ministerial reforms, it 
maintained control over the fields of justice, public security, and economy.  
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 Although it is the masses that own the state in the Jamahiriya system, Gaddafi 
theoretically maintained his role as the absolute decision maker for many years owing 
to his place as the ideologue of the system. It means that Gaddafi's tribal linkage, 
patronage relations and the capacity to rule over the local governors achieved great 
success and dissuaded the opponents. What’s more, he evolved into one of the most 
influential autocratic leaders in the region in terms of the oppressing the dissident 
groups, and regional Islamic movements. Mainly, it is a must to underline the role of 
patronized bureaucratic elite controlled by Gaddafi in the analysis of power struggles 
during the process. Thus, one needs to take account of the tribal social structure as a key 
factor in explaining the social, political and military institutions as the agents against the 
political opponents and militia organized against the regime.64  
3.1.2.3. Gaddafi’s Policy on Tribes 
  
 A key aspect of understanding the case of Libya is the Gaddafi’s policy on 
tribes, as Libya as a weak state torn asunder by its tribal struggles intended towards 
divide-and-rule in terms of the control of oil resources and cross border trafficking of 
legal / illegal goods. In the lack of state territorial control, ethnic and tribal cleavages 
that were oppressed by Gaddafi rule, turned out to be the main dynamic. During and 
after the Italian invasion, the influential tribal cleavages controlled by the Ottoman rule 
persisted in Libya. In other words, even when Libya gained independence in 1951, 
tribal governments maintained their autonomous socio-economic policies. However, 
right after he took the power, Gaddafi attempted to take control over the tribes since he 
soon realized he would be unable to take control of other tribes unless the familial ties 
are utilized. He, therefore, applied his own strategies: the use of force to intimidate and 
bribe to persuade. The result was the alliance of his tribe with Magadha, Wargella and 
Al-Awagir which was going to be called “the tribe of the state”. In that vein, a third 
tribe leaving room for Asabiyya united the four tribes in harmony with the idea of “state 
tribe” empowering the rule of Gaddafi over the tribal issues. Even though he rejected 
the “backwardness” of the tribal cleavages and customs, he had to involve in the tribal 
affairs and united them to recover his inability to penetrate into the tribes located in the 
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east of the country.65 As the strategy was “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, the 
post-Gaddafi tribal conflicts are going to be the component of the relationship between 
the weak state and political violence.   
 While the concept of weak state is at the heart of our understanding of the case 
country, the intervening variables assisting in the weakening of Libya are posited in this 
section. The next chapter is going to analyze the relationship between each of these 
variables and political violence, in other words, the question of the next chapter is going 
to be the following: how the conditions of weak state activate and facilitate the political 
violence? 
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CHAPTER 4 -  THE ARAB SPRING AND CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA 
	
	
4.1. The Emergence of ISIS in the Context of the Weak State Libya 
4.1.1. "Weak State" Factors that Contributed to the Rise of ISIS and Other 
Islamist Movements in Libya 
  
 This chapter intends to focus on the weak state factors respectively focusing 
on the following problem fields: the lack of central authority, economic conditions, 
justice system, unfolded social groups and border security system. These are going to be 
the anchor for the analysis of the relationship between weak state conditions and 
terrorism.   
 A number of incidents in international environment such as the Russian 
occupation of Afghanistan, the Bosnian Genocide between 1992-1995, the US 
occupation of Iraq, and the civil war in Syria activated a fruitful ground for terrorist 
groups due to the deep crisis in these regions.  Apart from this, the resentment owing to 
the topple down of elected Islamic parties in Egypt, Palestine and Algeria and the 
declaration of these political parties as the terrorist organizations by international 
powers was another factor contributing to the process. In that aspect, the military 
intervention of the international forces in the region, the unfolded weak state conditions, 
widespread corruption and poverty provided a fruitful ground for the tendency towards 
violence and terrorism. As a result, the ISIS survived as a tumor getting more powerful 
in Iraq and Syria and then spreading to Libya where weak state conditions were fully 
conducive to religiously motivated extremism.66 
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 Before examining the structure of Libyan society, it is worth noting that the 
Arab Spring dominating the Middle East societies and toppling their long-term rulers 
contributed to the marking of boundaries between different groups in society. This has 
become a significant factor for instability. The marking of lines between ethnic, 
sectarian, and tribal groups resulted in legitimacy struggles between them with the 
ultimate objective of domination over other groups. 
  To better understand Libyan society, it is necessary to note that it consists of 
several tribes coexisting with each other. Since the royal period, tribal community 
groups have preserved the norms of conservative Islam. However, many Islamist 
movements attempted to penetrate into the Libyan society since the 1980s.  Different 
Islamist movements were to make a decision on the point whether violence would be a 
part of their praxis. While some struggle to be effective through political participation, 
other extremist movements believed that violence is necessary tool for radical political 
and social change. After the fall of the Gaddafi, the Islamist movements reappeared in 
Libya. The Libyan society suffered from the Gaddafi’s legacies, the lack of 
institutionalization, and the lack of common knowledge about how to come together. 
Moreover, such a disengagement is also reflected within the institutions such as military 
forces and social movements. It led to the disintegration of military institutions. 
Although there are deep ideological, intellectual and political differences between the 
cleavages, they can unite to fight a common enemy as in the case of fighting against the 
Gaddafi regime.67 
 Though it did not face a total turmoil and crisis like Syria, Libya has 
irreconcilable interest groups and government candidates that are in constant rivalry and 
seek to maximize their power over particular regions and social groups. The state lacks 
central authority to protect the borders, exercise national sovereignty, secure territorial 
integrity, and monopolize the legitimate use of violence. Struggles over territorial 
control have led to insecurity and ultimately has affected oil production that is the single 
most significant source of Libyan economy. The political chaos has not been resolved 
so far, resulting in the shortage of social and public services. In this context, it is 
necessary to explore the components of the weak state conditions in Libya, which has 
affected the basis of ISIS and similar radical organizations that gained the opportunity 
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to spread in the country during and after the civil war. This section attempts to unfold 
the components of the context  leading to political violence and terrorism.   
4.1.1.1. Libya's Administrative Vulnerabilities 
	
 There are many indicators that justify Libya's categorization as a "weak state" 
after the civil war. The most important of these indicators in post Gaddafi Libya is the 
absence of a legitimate authority accepted by all groups and political and social groups. 
The "Confronting Day of the Anger" in Libya, started in February 2011, shows that the 
conflict surrounding the whole country in such short period has continued despite 
changing actors and conditions. After the uprising against Gaddafi, the opponents 
succeeded and overthrew him and started a new process for Libya. In fact, the conflict 
between Gaddafi and his opponents evolved into a number of new conflicts due to the 
lack of authority and security in the state mechanism. Primarily, there were three 
ongoing conflicts in Libya between a) the military forces and the tribal forces, b) 
between the Tobruk Representatives Assembly and the Tripoli National Congress, and 
c) finally between the parliament and the government announcing federalism in Barka. 
This situation in Libya may be seen as a conflict between outside liberal-secular forces 
and Islamist forces targeting to seize power. Additionally, the clash had an ideological 
basis and revolved around the struggle for power between two governments. This led to 
the continuation of battles between the militia and tribes for resources as well as for the 
control of trafficking routes between regions and cities and between ethnic groups and 
the country itself.68  
 To further understand Libya's incapacity to form a strong central government, 
it is of utmost importance to look at the past where it all began. Geographically 
speaking, the features of the country are conducive to the reproduction of a tribal 
system. The three-part geographical structure of Libya separated by the desert has 
adversely affected the formation of a national consciousness and a central strong 
authority in the country. The division of Libya between Tripolitania (in the west), 
Cyrenaica (in the east) and Fezzan (in the south) thus threatened the territorial 
integrity.69  Libya has two rival parliaments that independently delegate power to their 
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own cabinets and have their own armed forces. One of them is the House of 
Representatives in Tobruk whose members go through a democratic election process 
and constain a majority of nationalists and federalists. The other is the revived General 
National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli, in which Islamists with the long-expired mandate 
mainly dominate. The country appears to be irreversibly in turmoil, and Libyans 
themselves fear their country is following a similar path to the one the Balkans, 
Lebanon, Iraq and Somalia went through.70  Provinces, tribes, ethnic groups and other 
regional traits are crucial factors in Libya. They have extended their reach in the last 
seven years in an attempt to ensure survival, organize local armed groups and 
consequently generate security and stability in the country.71 
 In a similar vein, the weakened NTC claiming central authority based rather 
weak arguments and domestic legitimacy asked for international support. In that way, 
various militia and local military councils gained power, through the manipulation of 
the NTC to secure parochial interests.72 
 As mentioned above, the struggle for seize of power has made it impossible for 
the central government to consolidate its power. International intervention has also led 
to the re-consolidation of the local conflicting powers and problems. Each group sided 
with the international power assumed to maximize the self-interest of the group. This 
raises the depth of conflicts in Libya, especially among the militia and tribes.73 
Moreover, the vacuum of power in central administration after the fall of Gaddafi 
created further problems. Libya has turned into an uncontrollable country of militias 
carrying the banner of their religious or ethnic basis and seeking to maximize of interest 
of their groups. Constant clashes between forces have led to insecurity and political 
separation. In a nutshell, Libya with its oppressive rule and oil-fueled prosperity is 
replaced with Libya as a weak state in turmoil, fueled by tribalism.74 
 Since independence in December 1951, the people of Libya have not found an 
opportunity to initiate a democratic experience or to grow a political culture that 
promotes political and social dialogue. Hence, the basic difficulty for the democratic 
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regime was a political culture imbued with the past political goals and traditional values 
and political culture. The endless conflict in Libya affects social, political and economic 
indicators negatively.75 There is a lack of consensus on how Libya should be re-
organized and how community relations enacted horizontally ought to be managed. 
Despite some failing attempts by officers and non-governmental organizations to 
establish a broad national dialogue, there is little chance of a genuine public dialogue 
that could help achieve such a compromise among the Libyans. Without such an 
opportunity, relations between rival groups will continue to be the reason of division, 
and tension leading to failure in public services will not be finished.76  
 Consequently, the political confrontation in the country on the disruptions of 
the Gaddafi era reveals the inability of the government to present political products to 
the public. To begin with, the narrow and circumscribed provision of a trained 
workforce, shortage of fuel, water and electricity as well as basic resources have been a 
matter of urgency in some metropolitan areas of the country. As a matter of fact, the 
World Health Organization has clearly underlined the insufficiency of health equipment 
and medicines in Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi, where the intra-groups conflict 
destroyed medical depots and hospitals in 2014. Lastly, universities and schools have 
also suffered from such impact since 2011.77 Although the former regime deliberately 
attempted to restrict the effect of bureaucracy, with the significant exception of the oil 
sector, the unfolded bureaucratic tutelage is still felt since the public administration 
mechanism is divided into two parallel governments both seeking to improve the self-
interest that led to political division in public service institutions.78 
 In a broader perspective, two of the most important factors undermining the 
social and economic life during both Gaddafi-era and post-Gaddafi Libya are corruption 
and bribery. Specifically, the absence of fair and legislative procedures led to poor 
public services and to the loss of public trust in the state institutions and agencies.79 
Similarly, the weak performance of the government and the spread of financial 
corruption, social, political and security tensions, lead young people to seek for a power 
vacuums promising better life standards and freedom. That’s why the young Libyans 
																																								 																				
75 Islamist Movements in Libya, Fes.org.ma. (2018). [online] Available at: 
https://www.fes.org.ma/common/pdf/FES%20Libya%20English%20DEF.pdf [Accessed 23 Jun. 2018]. 
76 Molesworth, “Instability and Insecurity in Libya Analysis”, p.6.  
77 Stiftung, Bertelsmann. "Transformation Index BTI 2016." 2016. p.16. 
78 Molesworth, “Instability and Insecurity in Libya Analysis”, p.6.  
79 Easrerly, “Top five reasons the “failed state”” 
36	
	
see the legitimate right to take on arms and join militias to gain more money and 
influence.  
4.1.1.2. Economic Factors 
 
 In Libya, the most significant financial input is the hydrocarbon resources which 
are the property of the state. It is a state-owned company that produce and manage the 
oil resources. Though it has some advantages such as job opportunities for the 
unemployed, and a state controlling the market price, it also has some disadvantages as 
it leads to inefficient management due to poor political decisions. The mismanagement 
of the hydrocarbon resources lead to more corruption and inefficient use of government 
subsidiaries. Libya, known as a country rich in natural resources, has been characterized 
as a failed state due to the lack of economic stability, poor management of hydrocarbon 
resources, shortage of international financial resources and most importantly political 
instability led by the civil war. During Gaddafi's time, the billions of dollars gained 
from the hydrocarbons were channelled to fight against imperialism or to Gaddafi's 
foreign policy objectives like the African Union. The pre-civil war lapse was not 
entirely free from socio-economic fluctuations, adversely, high inflation rates stemming 
from price cuts, high housing prices, low-income level, the huge gap in income 
distribution, deterioration of living conditions, unemployment, an important long-term 
were the key hard-core issues the country was going through. To reveal more details, 
official sources have recorded Libya’s unemployment rate in 2009 as 27% and the 
youth unemployment rate as 65% (for people under 35 years). Nonetheless, it is 
important to underline the inconsistency between the education system, the discrepancy 
between the expected skills and existing ones, and rate of job expectation by the 
graduates. As a result, in spite of the developing economic indicators that followed the 
abolition of United Nations sanctions in September 2003, a large number of citizens, 
especially young people, were left out of work.80 In general, with the economic burden 
brought by the civil war, financial instability increased and the rate of joblessness has 
increased even more. In 2013, the Ministry of Labor stated that the official 
unemployment rate was 15%, but the unofficial estimates were around 30%. This figure 
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was expected to be even higher in the coming period. Unemployment is now around 
50% among young people and more common in cities. 
Libyans soon raised the question of legitimacy as a result of the lack of trust in 
the already established system, the turmoil without cease that had developed in the civil 
war, and the negative effects of these on their lives. Consequently, the long-term 
political crisis and ongoing uncertainty leading to huge economic losses caused both 
foreign and national investors to stop economic activities, the closure of factories, and 
the failure to use transportation lines.  
4.1.1.3. Ineffective Justice System 
 
 Framing the ineffectiveness of the Judiciary in Libya, the primary argument to 
be made is the deinstitutionalized structure of justice system: it is highly dependent on 
political authority, and seeks to protect and prioritize the interests of the state, even the 
interests of the political leaders, over the law. During Gaddafi's rule in Libya, the justice 
system was in a rather negative shape. Reconsidering the segmented structure of the 
society in the post-Arab Spring period defined by the common interest of the sectarian, 
tribal, and ideological interests, the Judiciary system started to be seen as a means of 
dominating the others.  
Returning to the period before the Arab-Spring, the regime’s policies showed a 
lack of capacity due to the authoritarian nature of the rule. To start with, the executive 
body exercised control over the judiciary through the intervention of the Ministry of 
Justice, weakening the judicial independence. As Molesworth and Newton mention, 
new reforms were introduced into the legal system adverting the profession itself and 
the private legal sector in 1981. Upon those changes, the increase in the wages of public 
servants was perceived as a bribe by the ruler to defend the state against those who lack 
trust in the state and justice system. Libyan Supreme Court ruled as a parallel court that 
functioned as a blocking mechanism against every single effort towards the will of the 
Libyans, with worsening rules since the break out of the Revolution itself.81  Lastly, the 
effectiveness of a straight and fair justice system has been on stake since Libyans feel 
uncertain in how matters of the law would be handled causing a 
significant impact on Libyans' access to justice, judicial and penal systems.  
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A report titled “Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Gaddafi Libya” disclosed the 
matter by pointing out that the Judicial Reforms implemented in June 2012 by the 
Supreme Judicial Council never came close to suggest a reform on the Judicial 
system.82 That is, as The Mufti of Tripoli, the highest religious authority, essentially 
suggested, assigned target tasks to abolish any article of the system that would outroot 
any principle of the Islamic laws. Furthermore, as actual members of the judiciary 
claimed, personal internal monitoring took place in order to adjudicate high-profile 
cases. Nonetheless, such screenings were never a matter of public knowledge therefore 
never cause civilians to suspect the correctness in judgments against those to whom the 
same judges were loyal servants not long ago.83 
Along with the lack of access to justice, Libyans had a difficult time to find state 
institutions since court buildings were all damaged, destroyed or out of order during the 
civil war. Reports on Libya by the Judiciary and Security sectors show the closure of 
many courts and state buildings. According to a Libyan law professor, in cities like 
Darna, Benghazi, and Sirt, courthouses were suspended as of March 2014 with minor 
exceptions on low-level cases. People seeking access to justice had no other option but 
to convert the town halls to courts in other areas where there was still any law-related 
activity.84 
The public was now asked to take a double leap of faith. The NTC (The National 
Transitional Council) had urged civilians to rely on the current system that had made 
them suffer for years abolishing the special courts established during the Civil war. 
Salah Al-Marghani pointed out that the lack of trust in the system and in the judges, was 
as powerful as that of during Gaddafi rule. Moreover, the council was merely asking the 
Libyans to turn a blind eye on the emerging chaos, to ignore the parallel judicial system 
led by armed groups and its irrational actions (arresting, kidnapping, detaining civilians 
without proof merely based on accusation).85 In accordance with this, the legal system 
has faced many but one clear problem, the indifference towards the violation of human 
rights. In fact, a 2013 April Libyan report on the Judiciary and Security sector 
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recommended the adoption of a new law concerning the penalization of torture, 
imposed disappearances, and discrimination.86 However, being a UNCAT (UN 
Convention Against Torture and other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) 
member state, Libya presented its concerns regarding the internationally adopted law 
but with little success. That is to say, in reality, the law mentioned was not being 
effectively practiced as torture and abuse were still in peak during the time in detention 
centres; state-run as well as militia-run enforced disappearances caused by armed 
groups outside of government control were a frequent matter. Thus, the authorities did 
not properly investigate cases of abductions and perpetrators were not brought to 
justice.  
Another subject of importance is ethnic discrimination. That is, Libya’s 
reflection of a weak state and poor legal system. Ethnic hatred and violence have been a 
matter of concern in the country as well as racial discrimination against skin-coloured 
Libyans including those originally of sub-Saharan descent. Most of these forms of 
bigotry emerged from the allegations that Gaddafi uttered towards African mercenaries 
during the war. There were reports of violence where many Tuaregs were taken from 
their homes to prisons. Thus, clashes seemed to take shape in Tripoli between the Tebu 
and Zaway tribes over smuggling routes in the southeast of the country. Additionally, 
extrajudicial executions took place in Libya that were never brought to light; all 
committed by the official security forces under the supervisory of the Ministry of 
Defence and Interior.87  
4.1.1.4. Security Vulnerability 
 
Between August and October 2011, the National Transition Council (NTC) 
turned out to perform the Gaddafi’s regime practices in security sector creating the basis 
of provisional official and informal institutions in Libya with low-level co-operation, 
different political agenda, and rival legitimacy claims. Apparently, the NTC’s executive 
organ and international counterparts had precise information about the Iraqi experience 
but failed to present an action plan. Such situation led them to appoint an intermediary 
administrator for the current ministries when taking control of the remaining state 
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institutions from the Gaddafi period by August 1-2011. What is more, a General 
Director of Security and Chief Staff was announced although the NTC did not seem to 
have a long-term security management plan beyond provisional measures, such inability 
in the new era has led to many weaknesses in the security field.88 Undoubtedly, there 
are security deficiencies in Libya beginning with enabling ISIS and similar radical 
elements to gain power and to take control of certain regions. Since the fall of the 
regime, the country has witnessed a violent conflict. In the same way, following the 
uprising of events that started in February 2011, Islamist movements persecuted by 
Gaddafi decided to return to Libya to fight against the regime. Moreover, the 
uncontrolled distribution of weapons in the civil war undermined the public security due 
to the increasing role of uncontrolled revolutionary armed groups from the Islamic 
movement. Such proliferation of weapons has led to the arming of Libyan tribes that 
wanted to defend themselves with guns to protect their resources and power. Indeed, a 
report by the International Crisis Group states that at least 125,000 people in Libya 
carry weapons. To worsen the case, Kupperman (2013) underlines that the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime presented Libya with a flooding of weapons later fallen into the power 
of militias with an approximate of 15,000 mobile and surface-to-air missiles 
accounted.89  
After the abovementioned accounts in 2011, Osama Juwaili, interim Minister of 
Defence, urged the rebels securing Tripoli to retain their guns and weapons rather than 
demobilizing and rehabilitating the 120,000 illegal armed ones (DDR). Surprisingly, the 
disintegration of military institutions was indeed a much more serious matter of concern 
for the Libyans. The initial idea was to illegalize Tribal violence and the use of 
weapons. However, the Provisional Government and the National Transitional Council 
could not integrate the militias into institutions of the government. Thus, many armed 
movements refused to release their weapons since they wanted not only to be part of the 
decision making but also be effective determining the fields of activity due to the 
legitimacy derived from the revolution.90  
Since The Ministries of National Congress, Defence, the Interior and Foreign 
Affairs office, have shown themselves unable to fulfil their responsibilities in the face 
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of any terrorist attacks, Libyan citizens started to fall into the arms of criminal 
organization in an urge to seek justice, overcome the problems of security in the country 
and prevent victimization. In other words, as Filípková and Kužvart clearly stated, the 
failure to do business by state institutions leads to the emergence of illegal organs to 
provide security and justice.91 Furthermore, the effects of discrimination during Gaddafi 
period and the tribal structure of Libya itself created conflicts between the post-Gaddafi 
interest groups leading it to the formation of proletarian security organizations. 
Therefore, when considering the relationship and integration of the Libyan Army High 
Military Committee (YAC) and the Libyan Armoured Corps (LZB) with the interim 
administration, some difficulties can hinder such unity. To explain it better, the 
"Hybridity" concept is a name given to describe the state deriving from the interaction 
between the official state apparatus and the illegitimate non-state actors such as 
militias.92 In fact, if a fragile state cannot provide direct control or indirect "security 
management" at the local level, legitimacy is shared with the local actors.93  
First, as Boege presented, private security and military companies are used as 
legitimate security providers without the consent of the official security institutions.94 
The interaction with the government agencies in the market has created "security 
communities" in the management field, where the state is just one example, and hosts 
many armed actors. These emerging hybrid entities may have authority from different 
angles; the authority of the official political institutions, the traditional cadre or the one 
resulting from the compromise of the individuals. Although there may be formal and 
informal elements within these institutions, this situation may pose specific problems 
for the state administration and foreign authorities. Additionally, the lack of a long-term 
security reform policy of the UGC has allowed the act of the state's legal authority to act 
against the armed, legitimate groups, including those not being in the interest of the 
state. The absence of a clear and centralized structure has made the security sector 
organizations vulnerable to conflicting and competing interests. As a matter of fact, in 
the mid-2014, the conflict between different interest groups peaked with the division of 
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the state and the security sector into two, emerging then two different powers claiming 
legitimacy.95 
Returning to the subject of hybrid security organizations, its appearance began 
shortly after the Libyan revolution with the participation of formal and semi-official 
element, leading to increased competitiveness and interest-oriented loyalty. In 
particular, the Libyan army is divided between rival interest groups making the new 
units represent certain local or ideological interests and blurring the boundaries between 
official and hybrid units. Furthermore, due to the development of hybrid entities and the 
attempts to gain formality in each unit, the security sector has begun to be determined 
by political polarization and ongoing competition over security sector entities has 
spread to the highest governing bodies. That is, a competition to control the budget, 
pensions, and equipment caused a crisis that broke out around the mid-2014. 
Consequently, such conflict marked the line between the cleavages in the state 
institutions, which led to two parallel governments, the two levels of executive body 
and the two different organization claiming legitimacy. Thus, the power balances that 
will be generated by the ongoing turmoil will be in the security sector and will 
determine the hierarchy. But, this cannot take place as long as there are two competing 
parties across the country that are not strong enough to seize the power and secure the 
state authority since it is unlikely that the consolidation of authority will come from 
either side.96 Lastly, there were some obstacles in front of the referents done within the 
scope of security. One was the polarizations that may have led to politicization. The 
second was an internal resistance to anti-reform reactions in the security sector, and the 
third was the government's limited capacity and resources. Although there was a need 
for a political consensus to overcome these difficulties, the first necessary was to 
establish a democratically accountable armed force in Libya in an appropriate manner.97 
4.1.1.5. Border Security Failure 
The failure to establish a centrally managed security organization in Libya is 
thought to increase the economic/trade volume along the borders as well as the 
formation of regional power authorities separated from the central power that the state 
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shows as weak and unsuccessful. Undoubtedly, one of the problems related to security 
after civilian strife in Libya is the inability to control the borders since security forces 
are unable to protect Libya's 4.348 km long land border and 1.770 km coastline without 
adequate equipment. As a result, migratory roads, cross-border trafficking, the 
smuggling of weapons, availability of country and armed extremists for the tribal 
conflicts, have weakened the Libyan state as for the inability to cut off such events 
causing special instability in the southern part of the country. To put it in another word, 
the fragile security system that Libya has is insufficient to repel emerging threats to the 
country. Conflicts of interest within the country have led it to a process of 
disintegration, just as the frustrations of the legitimacy of the provisional government 
are in the last days for Sudan. These on-going conflict areas will turn Libya however, 
into a "safe haven" for organizations such as Libya's illegal smuggling corruption 
groups and particularly ISIS.98 One can take cognizance of the fact that the border 
security, being more related to the foreign affairs, turns out to be a domestic problem 
through which different groups seek the maximization of their politically legal and 
illegal interests. 
To extend the matter, Engel explained that when terrorists with political 
connections raid state institutions like hospitals, ministries, and offices, matters turn into 
a rather chaotic threat to a country’s security system.99 Similarly, El-Katiri explains that 
Libya’s uncontrolled armed militias are by no means the only problem as it is not 
restricted entirely to its borders but, the conflicts between militias and the government 
authorities menacing the neighbouring countries security and the international 
community themselves.100 What is more, the incapability of the national army forces 
places Libya in a vulnerable position for international enemies to be active in the region 
such as al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups based in North Africa, the Sahel, and 
Europe. Those are supposedly trying to set training camps in Libyan lands where the 
central authority is not sovereign, as well as obtaining arms through the militias 
controlling the borders.  
Libya has become a safe destination for many extremist groups since 2011. 
Those looking to recruit and expand their fields and to collect weapons have found the 
country a suitable place for their operation. In fact, prior Operation Dignity, Ansar al-
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Sharia in Benghazi is claimed to have utilized the city’s Benina International Airport as 
a transfer point for foreign fighters as a way to places of conflict and battlefields like 
Syria.101 That, by far, is one of the most important results of the lack of security in a 
country like Libya since different social groups in the country create pressure against 
the other as radical Islamists commonly practice it. To specify, Heneghan reports that 
since there were no clear policies but loss of control over the significant amount of 
mosques to Salafists and Sheikhs, more random attacks occurred as a clear proof of the 
failure of the state to protect the country’s territorial Integrity allowing ISIS-like groups 
to gain legitimacy.102 
The war in Libya left many traces since the number of people forced to abandon 
their homes were massive. Initially, the United Nations warned of a temporary 
humanitarian crisis in Libya in 2014. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) announced that 100,000 people had to leave their homes due to the ongoing 
conflicts. In fact, according to the UN representative Adrian Edwards, there was an 
estimate of approximately 393,420 citizens that turned out to be immigrants in Libya 
because of burgeoning violence in May; they were dispersed into 35 towns and cities 
that resulted in the increase in the need of shelter, health care services, infrastructure, 
water and food and other main commodities. WHO (World health care) explained that 
in 2015, 2.5 million people (more than a third of the total population) needed immediate 
help.103  
4.2. The Rise of ISIS in Libya 
 
4.2.1. Roots of Islamic Radicalism 
 
In the first half of the 20th century, when traditional empires dispersed and 
colonialism was active, there was a deep identity problem in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Traditionally shaped Islamic institutions had lost their dominance status thus, 
concepts and institutions from historical accumulation were disabled, and movements 
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with traditional and Islamic discourse were pushed out of the political centre. Much of 
the Islamic world meeting the nation-state structure, turned into a process of 
nationalization with a deep political and cultural transformation. Such emergence, led to 
a deep break away from the traditional political order of the Islamic world, either by 
building totalitarian governments or traditional kingdoms. That is to say, dictatorial 
governments were set as a permanent obstacle against the masses’ political participation 
demands in these countries. In these processes, the Islamic communities and 
movements that passed the opposition went through different stages in the following 
decades.104  
Essentially, Islam has been a word that has given way to different interpretations 
and uses in the historical process. In a sense, Islam has been used as a universal religion 
like a belief, thoughtful worship, and a monotheistic religion with its own ideas. 
Conversely, it has been used to indicate a certain civilization in history. Islam is not 
monolithic as a religious institution but a religion applying in different forms to the 
different variables of the time. That is, there is a discrepancy between traditional Islam 
in practice -traditions adopted by the practicing Muslims- and Islamic understandings 
that scholars and theologians have brought to discuss since today we need to refer such 
concept to the groups and movements regarding as fundamentalists or under political 
Islam bases as a modern phenomenon. 
Undoubtedly, we need to set aside the basis of ever concept in Islam. For 
starters, the first Islamist ideologist Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) along with the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), founded the notion of Islamism 
based on radicalism which leads to the concept of jihad giving birth to Mawdudi’s 
extremist ideas (1903-1979). To continue with this idea, it is important to mention that 
the main goal of political Islam is the application of violence to overthrow a rule that 
does not enforce religious principles summarizing it to a form of an Islamic state. 
Moreover, when examining the historical and local routes leading to radical currents in 
the Islamic world and global jihadist ideology; on one hand, various micro-Islamic roots 
reflecting their own conditions are exposed. Also in those stages, traces of the 
Wahhabism and the Indo-subcontinent Islamism that were influential in the 
establishment of an Arab-Islamic state are seen by the establishment of the Salafi 
																																								 																				
104 Kekilli, “Libya'da Daiş.” 
 
46	
	
ideology organized by Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). As Bodur points out that there is a 
relationship between terrorism and an Islamic variant called Islamic fundamentalism 
that, has an important influence on the formation of their interest mainly after the 
September 11 attacks.105 As a matter of fact, those performing terrorist activities made 
use of the religious rhetoric and motifs in terrorist organizations at the same time. Of 
course, since the end of the Cold War, many Western observers, such as Orientalist 
Bernard Lewis, for example, based their analysis on the tension of the old juxtaposition 
of jihad between the classical Islamic dualism of Daryl-Islam and the Darul-Harp.106  
Due to the siege of imperialism, Islamic social and cultural values were being 
attacked by secular, western and Christian interpretations enhancing crises in various 
layers of Muslim societies. Such revival emerged in Muslim societies facing threats to 
distort the ideas of Islam and the Muslims. In this context, the thinkers of the Islamist 
revival are focused on what is the essence of Islam against foreign values. Considering 
that it began to develop from the second half of the twentieth century, the belief that the 
loss of power against the West could be improved by the seizure of the political power, 
was the reason of the new regimes of one-man-rule in many Islamic countries that had 
just achieved independence. 
Radical Islamists regarding religious beliefs as an obligation to enforce their 
ideological system to a newly created society seem to have an inherent need to call 
people to a religion of the traditional Salafi the original idea of Islam. That is a religious 
duty to make other comply and each of them to understand the concept of pure Islam. 
On the other hand, Political Islam rooting resulting from military, political, economic, 
cultural and intellectual branches of the Islamic world during the19th and 20th centuries 
seems to be moving towards the goal of Muslimization of the Islamic world 
(nationalism). Moreover, it is also argued that Islamic radicalization is a by-product of 
the globalization process, for instance, Bassam Tibi sees radicalism as a cultural outlet 
against the problems brought about by extension and fragmentation. Nonetheless, many 
Islamic movements naturally have transnational qualities.107 In fact, the general 
discourse goes beyond specific problems that any country has and whatever event 
happening in the Muslim world is generally regarded as a problem of the Islamic world. 
In Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, for example, the presence of many 
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nationalist warriors on the side of the insurgents supports this view. The factors of 
imperialism and globalization ultimately take place in the process of modernization 
development, and it is claimed that the universal crisis, which is generally subjected to 
modernization, causes the revival of religion in Muslim countries due to its special 
qualities of Islam. Rubin defines the debate that arises regarding the fact that modern 
values harm the principles of Islam as the problem of civilization. Similarly, Esposito 
expresses that Islamic revival is not merely a product of the Iranian revolution, but a 
result of the global uprising of Islam in the region extending from the Atlantic to 
India.108  
To define these movements, it is necessary to understand that, radicalism is 
sometimes used to express a broad range of fundamentalism terms, such as extreme 
ethnic and separatist organizations, certain religious social movements, especially 
political Islamist movements from the West and extreme ideological social structures 
not in use. Although the fundamental motivation of radicalism is shown as religious 
justifications, many other motives play a role in the righteous transformation of social 
movements. Especially today, radical terrorism uses political violence as a tool and 
operates in a geographical area in order to achieve its purpose. Furthermore, these 
organizations have perpetrated terrorist attacks as a justification of their universal ideals 
and a proof of their struggle for independence and religious legitimacy. Essentially, in 
the process of the radicalization of Islamic movements, the sectoral nature does not give 
much credit to religious authorities outside themselves; instead, they are based on 
ideologies focused on literal meanings of religious texts. For this reason, these religious 
militants connected to their own religious interpretations produced through symbolic 
interaction within the group with a rather poor theological education, socialize and 
become increasingly radical within a narrow group. In a nutshell, it is necessary to state 
that Islam cannot be identified directly with terrorism, but religion is also used to refer 
to those in such acts.109  
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4.2.2. Libyan ISIS on the Rise 
  
Many extremists see violence as a basic and direct resource for change. The 
ideology that conducts them to revolutionary acts of brutality is guided by their literal 
religious beliefs. This modus operandi can be found in Europe, Africa, and Palestine 
and all over the world. However, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the collapse of the Berlin wall destroyed all hopes to change history 
through violence. So much so that, with the unification of the two Germanys, capitalism 
declared its definitive victory and all the ideologies and great accounts were laid to the 
disposal of history. After the 1990s, this breeze actually led to a great deal of protest 
against the West. In this respect, there has not been a global protest ideology in the 
West for many years to fill the place of the Left. With the September 11 attacks, the 
globalizing Radical Salafism, together with the revolutions in the social media and 
culture industries, probably succeeded in filling this new global protest ideology.110 
In recent years, attention has been drawn to the growing and widespread of 
organizations like al Qaeda and its beliefs. These organizations come from radical 
political Islam, regardless of whether they are recognized as part of al-Qaeda or 
compatible with the foundations based on the ideological Islamic discourse brought to 
the state of the Salafist Jihadi movement. To illustrate, in Libya, an increasing role is 
emerging due to the deterioration of political and security situation. During the Arab 
Spring, the propagation of public movements continued as a domino effect. 
Nonetheless, radical organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS came as a surprise in this 
process, where the leaders were interested in these peaceful public movements in the 
name of democracy, pluralism, social justice and the fight against corruption.111  
Undoubtedly, one of the most important phenomena in the process of the 
transformation of radical Islam into a weaponized organization is Afghan jihad. It is 
stated that the ISIS terrorist organization has lived in jihadi groups through processes 
such as the Afghan jihad, the invasion of Iraq and the civil war of Syria fostering the 
ideology developed on the Zarqawi line. It can be then said that the ISIS getting 
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organized in Libya in this frame came to life in parallel with the emergence processes of 
associations. As a state-like structure that swifting at local, regional and global scale, 
ISIS terrorist organization acts with a progressive doctrine of war and violence have 
integrated themselves with the local, regional and global scale. Continuing, the 
organization established in Iraq (2004) and rooted up to Ibni Taymiye, Ibni Kayim 
Cevzi and Muhammad Abdulvehhab use of violence and jihad, has achieved field 
dominance in place through means of deep political, social and economic turmoil in the 
post-Arab region of the Arab world. In order to fill the bottom of its religious and 
political rhetoric, the organization embraced the production of videos to be exposed on 
social media in the form of a book collection, to attract and recruit young people from 
many parts of the world.112 
The organization built up a new tridimensional geopolitical strategy to seek to 
establish its own dominance by getting rid of the current political structures and 
ideological discourses in the region. The first called the "inner geographical circle" 
consisting of Iraq and Syria, the second "close circle" consisting of the broad Middle 
East and North Africa, and the third "far outer circle of Europe, in America and 
Asia".113 The group formed something called the "inner ring" of the central defense 
zone. Its aim is to keep the "near circle" in place attracting new fighters to the center by 
carrying out terrorist actions targeting confusion in the "far circle". Libya has located 
within the second geographical circle that the organization calls "the immediate 
environment." To disperse the oppression of DAISY on the target "center ring", its 
members seek to encourage the flow of foreign warriors to the center and to defend the 
geopolitical expansion area through the new provinces joining that way the so-called 
"Islamic state". In addition, ISIS's actions within its immediate environment and other 
local organizations have enabled the widening of the territory to gain greater flexibility 
in the defense of central geography.114 
The recent literature putting light on the variable nature of war in the Twentieth 
Century reveals that forthcoming conflicts will firstly target networks rather than 
traditional actors, state. The latest operational concept of the United States Army 
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entitled "Win in a Complex World" is an official statement that superior firepower and 
power of the numbers do not give a single victory guarantee. Fredrick Wehrey 
summarizes the social complexities of the post-revolutionary revolution in Libya by 
saying "it is easy to trace Libya’s breakdown as a political struggle between Islamists 
and liberals." In fact, local and regional power commissioners, former Gaddafi 
bureaucrats and modern revolutionaries were some of the ones in exile and 
abovementioned imprisoned Islamists and those who returned from Afghanistan.115   
Like other Arabs, Libyan Arabs participated in the Afghan jihad and joined 
international jihadi circles and trained al Qaeda leaders in their camps in Afghanistan. 
In fact, Libyan jihadists are said to be the most critical group of the "Afghan Arabs" 
compared to the rest. Thus, Libyan jihad had gained identity by creating a serious 
organization in this process.116 Apparently, Muammar Gaddafi held a multi-tiered 
country by manipulating traditional tribal interactions, secular urban elites, and 
Islamists wanting to return to Shariah governance. A short-term purpose was reached by 
the US and NATO, supporting an uprising to overthrow the long-running Libyan 
dictatorship; therefore, an internationally recognized Provisional National Government 
was established.117 However, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and similar Islamist groups saw the 
Libyan revolution as an opportunity. The strategic goal of AQ's leadership in Libya was 
is just as Atiyah al-Libi would say: "The Arab Revolutions and the Season of Harvest 
Arabs" meaning to take advantage of the aftermath of the revolution to promote a 
radical and revolutionary change and to ensure the sovereignty of Allah's Shariah. It is 
important to note there is a similarity between AQ and ISIS's models of social base 
acquisition in the sense that, both groups have a common aspect to try to use social and 
political complaints that people are suffering to their own benefit.118 Yet, the most 
important feature that distinguishes ISIS from other jihadist circles is the answer given 
by al-Qaeda, in relation to the question of who they are against to. To be more specific, 
while the Al Qaida line was directed at a distant enemy known as the "non-Muslim 
occupiers", the organization developed a strategy based on "brutal administration" 
targeting Muslims and Shiites in different minds. According to this strategy, it is 
necessary to concentrate on weak countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. As in Iraq 
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and Libya, with a strategy of reintegration followed by entering into alliances. In this 
context, the organization aimed at the weak governmental structures in order to defeat 
the geopolitical expansion and to join the so-called "Islamic state". As in North Africa 
and Libya when entered into the search for alliances and while in there, conflicted with 
other jihadi groups.119 
To continue with this idea, we need to recall that by mid-2014, the global 
network of Jihadist in Libya has gained power and extension since a new generation of 
fighters were in rising. As a matter of fact, young men in their twenties born between 
1990 and 1994 were the highest amount of recruits rather than mature and experienced 
fighters from Libya to be part of the cause in Sirya.120 Essentially, many factors 
contributed to the rise of the Caliphate self-proclaiming the power of ISIS in Libya. 
These factors have been influenced by the collapse of the state, internal conflicts, the 
marginalization of some political, tribal and local communities, the presence of a 
"jihadist tradition’’, and the existence of radical opposition. While the rise of ISIS in 
Sirt and Derna was achieved mainly by the introduction of warriors returning from 
Syria, the situation in Sirte was quite different. Seen as the castle of the female in the 
old regime, Sirte was similar in the thought that the dynamics of ISIS contributed to the 
growth in Iraq. That is, a certain population marginalized in support of tribes and former 
senior officials in Sirte concerns less enmity to the movement of Al-Baghdad from the 
regime. Indeed, those groups losing their credibility in the old period prefer ISIS instead 
of the regime. 
Although Libya has the same level of ethno-sectarian conflict that characterizes 
the Iraqi context, it is not a coincidence that ISIS has expanded its affairs in Sirte where 
Muhammad Gaddafi was born, as it has always been a traditional reference point. After 
the fall of Gaddafi, the Qadhadffa tribe was marginalized and abandoned by the Tripoli 
government and was accused of associating other militias with the old regime. 
Inevitably, some of the young men of Kaddafi's tribe defended ISIS for reasons that are 
more political than ideological, with the support of old regime affiliates and the absolute 
source of their old age. This explains why some of the Colonel's supporters were turned 
into ISIS units. Moreover, although Gaddafi’s officials contribution were much smaller 
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than existence of the ex-Ba’athist officers in the Syrian-Iraqi branch of the ISV121, the 
weight and presence of the former Libyan regime made it possible to have a large local 
military formation in ISIS Sirte as it has a central location to effectuate plans.  
Naturally, another important factor for the Islamic State has been the numerous 
weapons in the country during Gaddafi’s regime, contributing to the rapid rise of ISIS 
in Libya. A study conducted by the Quilliam Foundation mentions the leak of [these 
munitions] from Libya to Mali is a very short amount of time,"122. Firstly, After 
strengthening its presence in Sirte, ISIS wanted to take control by operating the small 
towns around the city. In the first six months of 2015, it took control of the city of 
Nofaliya and Harave district. Furthermore, in October of the same year, the 
organization made an attempt to take control of Ecdabya, one of the major cities 
between Sirte and Benghazi. However, as in the case of Derne, "Ecdabya Mü- cahitleri 
Şule Meclisi" has taken ISIS from the city in Ecdabya. Although local al-Qaeda groups 
supposedly declared allegiance to ISIS, Muhammad Zavvi, one of the city's leading 
jihadi leaders, was seen to continue operations against ISIS in the House of Commons. 
Lastly, another important city that came to the world in the press in the presence of ISIS 
was Sibrata. It is stated that ISIS has established a training camp near the city and 
planned to spread out its surroundings.123 
The division of the Islamic State in Libya into the provinces of Tripoli (west), 
Barqa (Cyrenaica, East), and Fezza (Southwest), is the product of ISIS unrecognition of 
Libya as a single state entity and the legitimacy of other nation states in the Middle 
East. All the operations have been directed from the cities already mentioned on a 
search for control and power of the entire country. Inevitably, in places where ISIS had 
instituted itself, army forces with their own infrastructure were organized as to fight 
against enemies inside and outside Libya. That is to say, ISIS directed its guerrilla 
groups against Tipoli and Tobruk governments, as well as the ones supporting them. 
Clearly, in order to weaken the ruling parties in the country, the organization focused on 
attacking the capital city of Tripoli and its surrounding. On the other hand, Tunisia was 
the outsider to attack next as of its proximity to Libya and during that year; ISIS 
executed a number of terrorist attacks in the country. Lastly, it is important to mention 
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the terrorist group has cooperated with Jihadist organizations in North Africa and Sub-
Saharan regions.124 
Due to its central location, Libya has been known as "The Strategic Gateway for 
the Islamic State". As it was examined before, the constant trade of illegal weapons 
passing through the borders, have provided somehow a great support to ISIS. However, 
that has not been the only matter of concern. In fact, it has been reported that illegal 
immigrant boats have and still are easily passing through European waters through the 
wide coastal strips of the country, making those crusaders risk their lives as they 
proceed. It is of utmost importance to have a strategic evaluation in the sense that, the 
pressure of the so-called "Islamic state" in Iraq and Syria could be reduced if united.125 
Nonetheless, when considering the importance of Libya as "the gateway to Egypt, 
Tunisia, Sudan, Mali, Algeria, and Nigeria", we need to look at the apparent connection 
between ISIS and the Sinai Peninsula plus the alleged coalition between Boko Haram in 
Nigeria and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.126 As a matter of fact, through several terrorist 
attacks that would make international headlines for weeks, the alliance between al-
Baghdadi and ISIS was indeed formally announced. The idea was to set a precedent by 
sending a message to the world concerning the growing capacity of the terrorist group 
and spree the campaign of recruits.127  
When recruiting is concern, ISIS militants have launched an intense campaign to 
increase militant figures among the local population. Numerically, although ISIS 
members constitute a very small proportion of the Libyan population, they have been 
able to hold the dominance of space in the regions they control. Despite many efforts to 
combat the spread of this group, ISIS has developed many different motivational tools 
to increase the number of member militants since it has mostly the advantage of 
controlling and managing local tribes and jihadist groups.128 Consequently, as attempts 
to increase the number of ISIS training and militants are intensifying, Libyan warriors 
fighting in Syria announced the formation of "Al-Battar Battalion" towards the end of 
2012. Furthermore, by mid-2014, the warlords belonging to Battar Taburari returned to 
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Derne and officially proclaimed having established the "Islamic Youth Shura Council" 
(IYSC). An UN report stated that about 3,500 Libyan citizens left the country to join 
jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq. Eight hundred of them returned to Libya to participate 
in local movements. In October 2014 however, when the jihadi circles in Syria 
polarized ISIS, the IYSC declared that Abu Bekir allegedly had waged war. During the 
announcement of this work, the elements bearing the ISIS framework had a parade 
ceremony and made a full show. With the return of these militants back to Libya, ISIS 
had an important striking power of experienced militants supporting religious 
motivations by contributing their experience in war zones and the upbringing of new 
militants.129  
Training operation camps belonging to former Libyan Army have been used as 
concentration and training facilities for ISIS militants to engage in military and terrorist 
activities inside and outside of the country. What is more, foreign warriors from Africa 
and the Arab world are also being trained in these camps. It is estimated their location is 
not only in Sirte but also near other cities where ISIS conducts its existent. Additionally, 
taking advantage of the governmental power gap in areas where it dominates, ISIS 
fulfills a number of public services in order to strengthen its legitimacy in these regions, 
such as collection of taxes and delivery of public services, cleaning streets, careful 
storage of groceries, and providing jobs for doctors, engineers and lawyers. The absence 
of a central government in Libya has functioned as a fertile ground for the survival and 
development of ISIS meanwhile it also recognizes that the formation of a functional 
competitor governmental entity would make it difficult for it to process development.130 
In order to build finances, ISIS has targeted the nascent UN-backed GNA in 
light of detrimenting its sources and support. An example of this can be seen in the 
2016 disastrous attacks that ISIS carried against a military training center in Zliten in 
west of Tripoli, as well as stricking checkpoints of oil infrastructure in RasLanuf and 
Sidra (Report: The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset,2016,7). In this 
context, ISIS is aware of the financial resources needed to continue its existence in the 
regions where it dominates. Nevertheless, in order to create strong economic structures 
to support its militants, ISIS is using its previous experiences in Libya. In the first 
period, when ISIS felt its presence in the country, the salaries of the militants from the 
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state were a substantial source. Especially in Sirte, most of the Islamic revolutionary 
militias financed by the state continued to receive such support after becoming a 
member of ISIS. Even after joining it, these core militants managed to stay on the state 
payroll as of the weakness of public financial management. Moreover, in territories 
controlled by ISIS, financial sources are looting, taxation, smuggling, corruption and 
forced donations as its governance template did not encourage a positive economic 
growth. More significantly, ISIS has gained self-sufficiency in financing thanks to 
plundering the tax system that had gradually increased. Additionally, another source of 
finance was to seize lands and distribute it among the warriors of ISIS by forcing the 
residents to abandon their own territories. This was accomplished by a tax system that 
seized the commercial properties and the buildings where taxes were unpaid. In other 
words, it is thought that towards the end of August 2015, all shops in Sirte paid taxes to 
ISIS even though their created system is much less developed than the one in Iraq and 
Syria. The zakat system promoted on social media has become an important source of 
income. In addition, road transit fees are an important source of revenue in the east-west 
coastal highway (el-Tariq al-Sahili), running along Sirte and the road from Sabah to 
Sabha.131 
As for learning from mistakes, ISIS could not repeat the economic model 
deployed in Syria and Iraq, even if warriors continue to withdraw from other groups 
motivated by money in Libya. ISIS plan was to employ technical workers in petrol 
refineries through threats, possibly as in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the income from 
these oil refineries foresaw the finance of the expansion process in Libya. However, it 
has not yet succeeded. For this reason, the current financial resources in the country are 
still weak since ISIS cannot control any of the oil and gas fields and refineries at this 
time. The most important reason for this is that other powerful groups defending these 
regions are dispersed and deployed at distant distances. That is to say, ISIS does not 
currently have a network to market this oil, even if it had acquired oil as a state since 
the trafficking networks of Libya can carry crude oil in the markets outside the 
historical country.132 In relation to its expansion, ISIS has moved into the Libyan 
coastline and national marine facilities (ports, anchorages and coast guard ships) and 
has entered the European infiltration industry with asylum and job seekers. The cruelty 
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generally applied to the local people in controlled areas will probably serve as a catalyst 
to the Libyans' exit, as in Iraq and Syria. To be specific, On May 17-2015, Libyan 
government intelligence adviser Abd al-Simple Haroun said ISIS used refugees as 
vehicles to transport its operatives in Europe stating that ISIS, via refugees, has 
developed millions of smuggling networks, earning millions of dollars and using the 
money to finance their terrorist activities.133  
Lastly, as seen in the examples of Iraq and Syria, ISIS has also targeted weak 
state structures in the area, trying to extend its dominance over "management of 
violence" and acting quite tactically and pragmatically. However, unlike Syria and Iraq 
and due to the historical characteristics and internal balances of Libya politics, ISIS was 
limited in very small cities and did not have the possibility to spread to large areas. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis has given an account of the factors in Libya in post-Gaddafi period 
that make it possible to define it as a weak state. In this study, the aim was to assess the 
weak state factors that are applicable to the case of Libya and the relationship between 
weak state and terrorism with respect to the case of Libya. I sought to determine the 
extent of the relationship between weak state capacity and terrorism. The study focused 
on weak state factors in the following problem fields: the lack of central authority, 
economic conditions, justice system, social groups, and the border security system. 
These have served as anchors for my analysis of the relationship between weak state 
conditions and terrorism.    
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible 
to state that weak state conditions and incapacity of the central authority facilitates the 
rise of terrorism and political violence. One of the more significant findings to emerge 
from this study is that Libya can be categorized as a weak state as it suffers from a 
fragile organization of the executive body, social groups, an insufficient border security 
system, and a dysfunctional justice system which are not only the products of civil war 
but also legacies from the Gaddafi period. The second major finding is that social 
groups in Libyan society seek to maximize their self-interest in the context of the lack 
of a central authority. While the search to maximize their interests is a common praxis 
for social groups in the context of functioning state authority, it may turn out to have a 
far-reaching effect in a failed state context as the failed state becomes a battlefield for 
the legitimacy and power struggles for various groups in the form of militias and hence 
political violence in a context in which the weak state leaves a vacuum for such groups. 
The more powerful, the more authority and say in the future of the failed state the group 
is expected to have. The failed state factors turn out to be motivation factors for such 
groups struggling for the domination over the others as the erstwhile political culture 
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during the Gaddafi era revolving around a privileged social group, or tribe motivates 
them to be the new privileged group in the future of the country.      
The following conclusions can be drawn from the present study: a) Libya can be 
categorized and evaluated under the category of weak state, b) the legacy of Gaddafi is 
still alive in the post-Gaddafi era as the social and political dynamics that were 
oppressed during his rule have been unfolding, c) the weak state conditions are highly 
related to terrorism and political violence as each social ideological and religious group 
seeks to maximize its power to have a say on the table of future Libya, and some prefer 
violent methods to increase their influence and to deter other groups from pursuing their 
conflicting ends.  
These findings suggest that there are numerous tasks awaiting the new Libyan 
government such as security, re-institutionalization of the rule of law, balancing the 
central authority vis-à-vis social groups and fostering a sense of common objective 
among the Libyan citizens. The role of international support should be constructive and 
not seeking the self-interest of their own nation states. In order to start from the scratch, 
Libya must depose the legacy of the Gaddafi regime and establish functioning 
institutions that are in service of common objectives. The most obvious finding that 
emerges from this thesis is the need to pay immediate attention to the security issue. 
The militias operating independently from the central authority pose an immediate 
threat to basic security and make it difficult to address the other problem fields. Re-
management of the economy and energy sources in a way that the Libyans maximize 
their benefits seems to be a crucial factor in defeating the ground of terrorism.     
After Muammar Gaddafi’s system had proved to be unsuccessful, the well-
known 2011 uprising broke out in Libya. After the overthrow of Gaddafi, the 
disintegration of official state authority and its organs led to the creation of a political 
vacuum in Libya. After the struggle to reform the security sector, the reform process 
was not managed successfully, resulting in the creation of a plurality of separate power 
centers. The ongoing conflict between Libya and many other power centers caused the 
state to fail in fulfilling its socio-economic, cultural and political functions and created 
resentful masses. What is more, the failure to establish a security system that covers the 
whole country in the climate of Civil War turned Libya into a safe haven where many 
terrorist groups can operate. ISIS, threatening the surrounding countries and causing 
terrorist activities in the international arena has succeeded in creating areas of security 
by making use of the security gaps in Libya. 
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In a wider context, Libya is very important for ISIS for many reasons: the first of 
these is Libya's geo-political significance; it is at the center of North Africa, near 
Maghreb neighboring Egypt and sub-Saharan countries, as well as being easily 
accessible to Italy, functioning as a bridge from North Africa to Italy. In the post-
Gaddafi period, Libya's governmental gap made it a safe port for ISIS. In addition, since 
the Afghan jihad, both the numerical and qualitative jihadist infrastructure of Libya has 
been very powerful. That is, the Islamic State is now preparing for a "remainder and 
expansion" by establishing a stable base in Libya. Furthermore, Libya is geographically 
central to the political systems in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East 
and hosts the largest oil reserves in Africa. These geographical facts, as well as the lack 
of sovereign institutions and the lack of a coherent state security regime, make Libya a 
fertile space for rapidly growing jihadist organizations. As the subject of the study 
involves a distinctive period when the ISIS was strong in Libya, and even though ISIS 
is no longer effective as it was, the study gives a general framework between weak state 
factors and terrorism. Regarding the decreasing effect of ISIS in the region and the 
emergence of new linked terrorist organizations, the study involves implications for the 
relationship between weak state factors and terrorist activities.  
In order to prevent ISIS's operations in Libya one has to accurately identify the 
factors that strengthen ISIS in the country and develop effective solutions against these. 
Effective opposition to ISIS’s violent campaign must involve the use of military, police, 
diplomatic and economic resources. To that end, the central authority should be re-
established in Tripoli to secure territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, this can 
only be achieved by restructuring the Libyan state on three levels. The first is effective 
governance by the central rulers. Secondly, a coherent and functional national security 
structure must be established covering all of Libya. Lastly, a security umbrella, 
composed of military forces, the police organization, and border security, must be 
brought fully under the control of the central government. 
In order to maintain the central authority in the long-term, Libya needs to get rid 
of the legacy of Gaddafi and ought to establish the ground for an independent 
bureaucratic class which does not prioritize the interest of their social group over the 
interests of the state and works for the institutionalization of the rule of law.  
This study has defended the view that Gaddafi’s personalized rule, the 
institutions of the state, his inconsistent foreign policy, and his policy on tribes turned 
out to be the factors weakening the state in the post-Gaddafi era. This underlines the 
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continuing legacy of Gaddafi in the post-Gaddafi era. The self-helping elite clique and 
selfish bureaucrats must be eliminated in order to provide a functioning state organism. 
The new leadership of Libya should serve as the leader of all Libyans, foster national 
identity, and assuage social and ethnic divisions. The central authority should also focus 
on developing social control mechanisms so that the future of Libya will not witness 
social groups leading to militia warfare, political violence, and terrorism. These findings 
enhance our understanding of the fact that social control is the basis of what makes a 
strong state. The new institutions should be established and these institutions must 
operate irrespective of existing social divisions.  
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